General Motors' Aggressive EV/AV Strategies May Payoff Big

Original Article Published on Seeking Alpha

Summary

  • The auto industry is going through an epic transformation, and the right strategy is crucial at these times.

  • GM's new strategies go beyond just surviving the transformation; they are taking the company into some exciting new markets.

  • Cruise and BrightTop represent major new sources of revenue beyond selling cars at retail.

  • If successful, these strategies could significantly boost GM's market value over the next couple of years.

The auto industry is going through the most significant transformation since its birth more than 100 years ago. This transformation will displace traditional auto businesses with new technologies, new markets, and new business models. There will be big winners and big losers. In my previous Seeking Alpha articles, I've covered electric vehicle investment opportunities (Electric Vehicle Investment Roadmap) and autonomous vehicle investment opportunities (Autonomous Vehicle Investment Roadmap - Part 1: Investment Opportunity Overview). Here I'm going to focus on one particularly significant company that just announced some new strategies: GM.

AV Investment Roadmap - Part 3: Lidar Companies

Please see the original article on Seeking Alpha

Lidar is an exciting new technology and a critical component for autonomous vehicles.

  • Recently, five Lidar companies (Velodyne, Luminar, Aeva, Innoviz, and Ouster) have come public or are coming public through SPACs.

  • Significant investor interest has driven high valuations for these companies.

  • This article provides an overview of the lidar market and prospects for these companies.

This is Part 3 of a series of articles on autonomous vehicle investment opportunities. Part 1 provided an overview of a roadmap for investing in autonomous vehicles (Autonomous Vehicle Investment Roadmap - Part 1: Investment Opportunity Overview). Part 2 covered the first and potentially the largest AV opportunity: Autonomous Ride Services (AV Investment Roadmap - Part 2: Autonomous Ride Services And The 'Waymo Bump' For Alphabet).

Another alternative AV investing strategy is to invest in companies that make components for autonomous driving. These components include a variety of sensors mounted on the vehicle and the computing capability inside. There are four primary types of sensors: cameras (or vision systems), radar, and perhaps the most important one: lidar. Lidar recently received much investor attention, so I'm going to focus on this.

Lidar (an acronym for Light Detection and Ranging) is a critical sensor technology for most autonomous vehicles, with the exception being Tesla. Lidar fires off millions of beams of light per second, enabling highly detailed measurements of everything around an autonomous vehicle. It instantaneously computes the exact measurement of any object up to a distance of 100 meters or more. Lidar has a 360-degree field of view, so it can see everything around a vehicle. It can measure the distance, shape, and velocity of all objects. Lidar is far better at judging distances than cameras, as well as being impervious to surfaces that are reflective, textured, or textureless. In addition, lidar is already digital, so it is much more efficient. Cameras require significant computing power to convert video into digital data. Lidar images are digital, but they are typically represented by color and shape images like the following.

Lidar has several important uses in autonomous vehicles. It is used to create highly detailed maps (HD maps) of streets, signs, trees, and all permanent stationary objects. Mapping vehicles will repeatedly drive around an area to develop detailed digital maps of that area, which are much more precise than GPS maps. When the term geofenced is used to describe an area, it means that the detailed mapping has been completed for that area.

These HD maps are then used by autonomous vehicles to accurately position the AV within an HD map. The vehicle knows exactly where it is on that map within a couple of centimeters. This positioning is then used to compute the actions of the AV, and as it moves, lidar immediately repositions the AV in the HD map.

Lidar is also used to detect and measure moving objects around the AV, such as other vehicles and pedestrians. It accurately measures the shape, distance, and velocity of objects. Lidar data is combined with data from radar and camera sensors on the AV in a computing process called sensor fusion. All of this data is then used to characterize objects based on an object library to determine if the objects are cars, trucks, people, animals, etc. This characterization is then used to predict the actions of these objects.

Lidar Market

Lidar is a rapidly growing market that is still in its infancy. Projections for the lidar market vary widely. It will clearly be a big market in the future, but there are some important characteristics to consider.

Lidar is perhaps one of the most crowded markets in the autonomous vehicle industry. Five lidar manufacturers recently went public. There are many other small lidar technology companies in the US and China. More importantly, many AV leaders are developing their own lidar technology because it is so critical. Cruise (GM), Argo (F), and Aurora have all acquired lidar startups to develop custom lidars while using off-the-shelf versions in the meantime. Cruise, for example, acquired Strobe in 2017 and is building its own lidar technology internally, as well as watching to see what comes from the marketplace. Waymo (NASDAQ:GOOG) (NASDAQ:GOOGL) has already gone through multiple generations of lidar, increasing resolution by 10X and dramatically reducing cost. Most likely, Apple is also developing its own lidar. Only the biggest AV companies can afford to develop their own Lidar, so there will be a lidar market for the smaller specialized AV companies. In addition to the AV companies, several automotive tier-1 suppliers are developing lidar technology. Large AV companies may also be interested in acquiring more advanced lidar companies.

Lidar like other technology components is "designed into" autonomous vehicles by companies developing AVs. Once "designed in", the customer agrees to long-term purchases over time. Lidar systems are not easily interchangeable, so design wins are critical.

In addition, price a critical factor in lidar. Early lidar systems for AV cost $10,000 or more. This wasn't a problem at that time since they were used for AV development and testing in low volumes. The cost of lidar is dropping fast as new technologies, such as solid-state lidar, are being used to re-engineer lidar. Lidar price projections now tend to be approximately $600 by 2025. This will make lidar much more affordable for autonomous vehicles, but the lower price will create a revenue challenge for lidar companies unless AV volumes increase extremely fast.

How large is the market for autonomous vehicle lidar expected to be? This is difficult to project, but here is a rough estimate. Using an assumption of approximately one million new autonomous vehicles produced in 2025 (Source: Autonomous Vehicles: Opportunities, strategies, and Disruptions), and assuming 3 lidars per vehicle at $600 each, this would translate into a total available market estimate of approximately $2.0 billion in 2025. The global market for lidar is probably double that estimate or $4-5 billion. Of this market, a large percentage would be served by AV companies producing their own lidar. As you will see, the cumulative 2025 revenue projections from lidar companies, far exceed this market estimate.

Let's look at the five recently, or soon to be, public pure-play lidar companies. All of these came public or are coming public through SPACs. So they provided detailed investor presentations prior to going public. Detailed presentations like these are used by SPACs but are not normally permitted for public companies. These presentations were used to justify the original merger valuations and, in my opinion, are probably overly ambitious. Most likely the revenue projections for 2025 are overlapping in the sense that potential customers are probably the same.

On top of this, the current valuations of these companies are much higher than the original merger valuations. Valuation is clearly an issue to be concerned about in these investments.

Velodyne (VLDR)

Velodyne was the first to develop 3D Lidar and has been the market leader for 13 years. It went public through the SPAC Graf Industrial. Since its inception in 2005, Velodyne has had a cumulative revenue of $750 million from more than 300 customers. Ford, Baidu, and Hyundai were strategic investors in the company, and it claims 165 projects in the works with customers,

Velodyne is focusing on reducing the price of its Lidar. It projects an average selling price of $600 in 2024, down from $5,200 in 2020. It has a solid brand. It is likely that many technology, mapping, and automotive companies pursuing AVs have used its products. Velodyne recently announced a multi-year sales agreement for sensors with Motional, an ARS company. Velodyne will be the exclusive provider of long-range, surround-view lidar sensors for Motional’s SAE Level-4 ARS vehicles. It also announced a sales agreement with May Mobility.

Velodyne reported 2020 revenue of $94 million on 4,100 lidar units. It projects 2024 revenue of $684 million with EBITDA of $148 million. Its current valuation is $4 billion, which is more than twice its original merger valuation. This valuation equates to 27 times projected 2024 EBITDA.

Luminar (LAZR)

Luminar was founded in 2012 by Austin Russell at age 16 when he received a prestigious Thiel Fellowship. It claims to have breakthrough technology using a differentiated lidar architecture and component-level innovation supported by many patents. Its architecture is scalable from passenger vehicles to commercial vehicles. It also has proprietary software to support the capabilities of its hardware.

Luminar has working partnerships with Volvo and Daimler Truck, which has a minority stake in the company.

Luminar's projected revenue includes hardware and software and is primarily driven by automotive production programs commencing in 2022. It forecasts revenue of $418 million in 2024 and $837 million in 2025 with over 90% of it coming from its existing partner base. Luminar's projected 2025 EBITDA is $365 million. Its current market cap is over $10.5 billion, which at $33 per share is more than 3 times its original merger valuation, and its share price was as high as $40. Its current valuation is 28 times projected 2025 EBITDA.

Aeva Inc. (NYSE:IPV)

Aeva Inc. is going public through a merger with the SPAC InterPrivate Acquisition Corp (IPV). Aeva, founded in 2017, is developing a 4D LiDAR on a chip that combines instant velocity measurements and long-range performance at affordable costs. Aeva uses frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) technology to measure velocity in addition to depth, reflectivity, and inertial motion. Aeva plans to scale its lidar platform to a range of industries beyond automotive, including consumer electronics, consumer health, industrial robotics, and security.

In September, Aeva announced a production partnership with ZF Friedrichshafen, one of the world’s largest tier-1 suppliers. The partnership will combine Aeva’s expertise in frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) lidar with ZF’s experience in the mass production of automotive-grade sensors. Aeva is also engaged with the VW Group on lidar for its next-generation vehicle platforms targeted for 2024 production.

Aeva projects revenue of $880 million in 2025 with 80% of that coming from its top 7 partners. ADAS and autonomous vehicle sales are expected to commence in 2024. A lower revenue prior to that is expected from development unit sales. Its forecasts for 2030 are even more aggressive with $6 billion in revenue and $3 billion in EBITDA.

Aeva's post-money equity value on November 1, 2020, in its combination agreement with IPV, was $2.1 billion. With IPV trading at about $18 per share, its imputed valuation is approximately $3.7 billion.

Innoviz (CGRO)

Innoviz plans to become public through a business combination with Collective Growth Corporation (CGRO). The combined company is expected to be listed on NASDAQ under the ticker symbol INVZ.

Founded in 2016 in Israel, Innoviz was one of the first to bring a high-end solid-state lidar to market and meet the stringent requirements of automotive OEMs. Innoviz’s solid-state lidar sensors and perception software are built for mass-produced consumer autonomous vehicles.

Innoviz has established several partnerships with tier-1 automotive suppliers, such as Harman, Aptiv, Magna, and HiRain.

Innoviz expects very little revenue until 2024 when it projects $220 million. 2025 revenue is projected to be $539 million with an EBITDA of $179 million. The merger has a pro forma enterprise value of approximately $1.0 billion, which is now up about 40% with CGRO trading at about $14. So, the current valuation of approximately $1.4 billion, is approximately 8 times projected 2025 EBITDA.

Ouster Inc. (CLA)

Ouster will come public through a business combination between Ouster, Inc. and the SPAC Colonnade Acquisition Corp (CLA). Ouster claims to have invented digital lidar in 2015, and it has patented digital lidar technology that boasts high performance and low-cost. Four new digital lidar products were launched since 2018. It also has tailored software to provide solutions for the unique needs of its target markets.

Its products are built on a flexible architecture that provides economies of scale and lowered costs shared across products. It has two flexible platforms: high-performing mechanical and solid-state technology. A single software operating system across all products offers virtually unlimited software-defined customization. Ouster claims 450+ customers and non-automotive customers account for approximately 85% of 2025 projected revenue.

Ouster projects 2024 revenue of $818 million, increasing to $1.5 billion in 2025, generating $569 million of EBITDA. 2021 revenue is projected at only about $34 million. Interestingly, it projects only about 15% of its revenue will come from automotive. The fully diluted pro forma equity value was approximately $1.9 billion at the announcement of the merger. With CLA currently trading at about $13 per share, this implies an approximate valuation of $2 billion. This would be approximately 3.5 times projected 2025 EBITDA.

Other Lidar Competitors

As mentioned, there are other lidar competitors. Tier-1 suppliers have traditionally provided components and sub-assemblies to auto manufacturers and have long-standing relationships. The French company Valeo (OTCPK:VLEEY), for example, has had success in lidar. It has been actively demonstrating its SCALA system in autonomous vehicles.

In addition, there are a number of other small companies developing lidar technology that are not (yet) public. These include the following, although there are also others:

  • RoboSense (Suteng Innovation Technology Co., Ltd.) a Chinese environment perception solutions provider of autonomous driving lidar and perception software. It has multiple trial customers and plans production in 2022.

  • Cepton Technologies provides state-of-the-art, intelligent, lidar-based solutions for a range of markets such as autonomous driving, ADAS, intelligent traffic systems, smart spaces, and industrial robotics.

  • LeddarTech is a Canadian company developing an environmental sensing platform for autonomous vehicles and advanced driver assistance systems. Founded in 2007, LeddarTech has evolved to become a comprehensive end-to-end environmental sensing company by enabling customers to solve critical sensing and perception challenges.

  • Quanergy Systems, founded in 2012, is a Silicon-Valley-based technology company offering smart sensing solutions. It provides time-of-flight lidar sensors and perception software for real-time capture and processing of 3D spatial data and object detection, identification, classification, and tracking.

  • AEye is the creator of iDAR™ (Intelligent Detection and Ranging), an artificial perception platform for vehicle autonomy, ADAS, and robotic vision applications. iDAR fuses solid-state agile lidar, an optional camera, and integrated AI to create a smart, software-definable sensor. AEye has partnered with leading tier-1 suppliers and system integrators to configure and manufacture the sensor at scale.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, lidar is a critical technology for autonomous vehicles, and some lidar companies will succeed and prove to be good investments. However, there are still many unanswered questions in this market. Will the major AV companies produce their own lidar or use lidar from others? Which lidar technologies will prove to be superior? How fast will the AV market develop? Will the lower prices for lidar still provide enough revenue?

The five lidar companies covered in this article all appear to have exciting prospects. Most likely though, only a couple of them will succeed. Still, all of the valuations are very high, which should inject some investment caution.

Disclosure: I am/we are long VLDR, LAZR, IPV, CLA, CGRO. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Additional disclosure: I invested early in these companies and still hold some of my investments, but have reduced some of them significantly.

A Snapshot of AV Testing in The U.S.

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Article originally published on Medium by Michael E. McGrath

In my book, Autonomous Vehicles: Opportunities, Strategies, and Disruptions, I summarize the strategies of the most advanced autonomous vehicle companies. With these companies making continual progress, AV testing can indicate progress and who is leading. Recently, the National Highway Transportation Safety Agency (NHTSA) launched the first reporting from its AV Test Initiative. Although not entirely comprehensive because reporting is voluntary, it provides an interesting snapshot of the extent and location of AV testing in the US. It identifies most of the companies testing AVs, reports the types of AVs they are testing, and shows the locations where they are testing. Three of the companies also reported their active testing geo-fenced domains.

AV testing of passenger vehicles (autonomous ride services) progresses through three stages: (1) the AV carries employees as passengers with an in-vehicle safety driver, (2) the AV carries public passengers with an in-vehicle safety driver, and (3) the AV carries public passengers without an in-vehicle safety driver. After completing of the final stage, the service is ready for public release. So, far only one company, Waymo, is at the final stage of testing. Cruise is second with a significant volume of testing, although it is still primarily in the first stage.

Waymo

Waymo is testing its fleet of AVs in two primary locations. Chandler Arizona is the primary test location, where it’s testing an autonomous ride services fleet in two ways. The first is the test of Waymo One ride services with public passengers using in-vehicle safety drivers. More importantly, Waymo is also testing its Early Rider program with select public passengers in completely autonomous vehicles without any safety driver.

Waymo’s test area in the Chandler area reported to the NHTSA is quite large is seen in the area outlined below.

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Source: NHTSA

Additionally, Waymo is testing tow other services in this same area. Waymo Via, its delivery service, is delivering goods with in-vehicle safety drivers. It is also testing heavy autonomous trucks with its test team and in-vehicle safety drivers.

Waymo is also testing autonomous ride services in Mountain View California with safety drivers and employee riders.

In addition to these broad testing programs, Waymo is testing its AVs in unique weather conditions: wet weather conditions in Seattle, winter weather conditions in Novi Michigan, extreme heat conditions in Badwater California, and extreme rain conditions in Miami.

While these are the currently reported test locations, Waymo previously reported that it has driven 20 million miles autonomously on public roads in 25 different cities. Waymo didn’t report the number of vehicles it is testing, but previously disclosed reports estimate that it is testing more than 600 AVs.

GM/Cruise LLC

Cruise is number two in the race for autonomous vehicles in the US. It is currently testing at three locations. San Francisco is its primary test location where it has 230 AVs operating in the area indicated here. These tests are currently restricted to employees with in-vehicle safety operators.

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Source: NHTSA

Cruise is also testing in Milford Michigan with approximately 40 AVs using the test team as riders and in-vehicle safety operators. And like Waymo, it is also testing in Phoenix with 12 AVs using employee riders and in-vehicle safety drivers.

Uber

Uber ACT has resumed testing after suspending activities following a fatal accident. It is currently testing in San Francisco, Pittsburgh PA., and Washington DC. All of these tests currently use employees as passengers and in-vehicle safety drivers.

Autonomous Shuttle Testing: Navya and EasyMile

Testing of autonomous shuttles has been more limited. Several companies are testing autonomous shuttles, usually in specific domains such as resorts, universities, state parks, etc. Navya, in conjunction with Beep is testing at Lake Nona and at two sites in Jacksonville Florida. EasyMile has ten test locations in Columbus, Utah, and Colorado.

Autonomous Delivery: Nuro

Nuro is testing its autonomous delivery Nuro 2 delivery robot in Mountain View. It uses a remote driver for the tests since the vehicle is too small for a human driver.

However, its most extensive testing is in Houston. There it is testing both its Nuro 2 delivery robot and a modified Toyota Prius in three specifically defined areas of Houston. The map below shows the boundaries of these three domains.

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As you can see these, particularly the largest one, are quite extensive. This provides Nuro with some excellent autonomous delivery testing. The Nuro 2 delivery robot uses remote drivers, and the Toyota Prius testing uses an in-vehicle safety driver.

Other Testing Not Reported

In my book, Autonomous Vehicles: Opportunities, Strategies, and Disruptions, I describe the testing by other companies that did not file voluntary reports with the NHTSA. Here are some of the more prominent ones:

  • Ford Autonomous Vehicles LLC — Currently testing in Detroit, Palo Alto, and Pittsburgh.

  • Apple — Currently testing in California, specifically Silicon Valley.

  • Motional (Aptiv/Hyundai joint venture) — Currently doing extensive testing in Las Vegas in partnership with Lyft. They claimed to have provided more than 100,000 rides covering 20 square miles and 2,000 locations.

  • Daimler Trucks and Torc Robotics are testing autonomous trucks on public roads in New Mexico.

  • Others — There are approximately 15 other companies that filed active testing reports in California for 2019, but most of these were limited.

Autonomous Vehicles Can Save Millions of Lives

Autonomous Vehicles Can Save Millions of Lives

Almost 40,000 people die in auto accidents every year in the US, and going back through annual records, 3,004,031 people have died in my lifetime. Many more people are killed every year worldwide, an estimated 1.2 million. In addition to fatalities, more than 2 million people are seriously injured every year in the US, and many of these have lasting problems. These deaths and injuries can be avoided, if we understand the causes and a potential solution.

Amazon Enters The Competition For Autonomous Ride Services

Summary

Amazon's recent acquisition of Zoox for an estimated $1.2 billion puts it squarely into the competition for autonomous ride services.

Autonomous ride services, not autonomous package delivery, is the strategic intention of this acquisition.

Amazon will need to invest another $1 - $2 billion, eventually much more to compete in this market, but it is an enormous market opportunity.

Interestingly, the big three technology companies -- Amazon, Alphabet, and Apple -- will be three of the major competitors for this market.

The strategic importance of this acquisition for Amazon should not be underestimated.

Last Friday, Amazon (AMZN) confirmed it was purchasing Zoox and declared its intentions to become a competitor for autonomous ride services or autonomous ride-sharing (NYSE:ARS). The significance of this strategic move cannot be underestimated. This positions Amazon to become a major competitor in what will be an enormous market opportunity, providing it with a second strategic expansion, following AWS, beyond its online retail business.

Amazon's Strategic Intention

Many reactions to this acquisition erroneously concluded that the acquisition of Zoox is intended to procure technology for autonomous delivery. It's not. Amazon made its intentions clear. Amazon said the deal will help bring Zoox's "vision of autonomous ride-hailing to reality," and Zoox will continue to operate as a standalone business within Amazon. Autonomous package delivery isn't practical for the foreseeable future because someone needs to drop off the package since most people are not at home to come out and get delivery from an autonomous vehicle. Autonomous home delivery of groceries from Amazon is a potential secondary use, however.

Amazon intends to enter the competition for autonomous ride services, essentially Uber without a driver. This is expected to be an enormous market, but it will also require a significant investment from deep-pocketed Amazon. It is rumored that it paid $1.2 billion for Zoox, which is almost as much as Zoox had already invested in developing its autonomous vehicles.

Zoox has a unique strategy for autonomous driving, one that has proven to be more expensive than others but also has some exciting potential. Amazon will probably invest another $1 - $2 billion to complete development of its autonomous vehicles and several billion more to build a fleet of vehicles for autonomous ride services.

Zoox Unique Strategy

Most of the early competitors in autonomous ride services, such as Waymo, are focused on developing an autonomous driving platform of sensors, software, and computing. They retrofit this technology platform to existing commercial vehicles to create the first generation of autonomous ride services vehicles. For example, Waymo, which is the leader in this new market, has a fleet of 600 Fiat Chrysler Pacifica Hybrid minivans that it retrofitted for its early ride services. It also announced that it will retrofit 62,000 more, and 20,000 Jaguar I-Pace electric vehicles, at its retrofitting factory in Michigan.

Retrofitting existing vehicles makes sense because it lowers the cost of development and introduction. Following the initial success of autonomous ride services, competitors will develop second-generation vehicles designed exclusively for autonomous driving without the need for human controls.

Zoox's strategy is to skip first-generation autonomous vehicles and develop second-generation vehicles purpose-built for autonomous ride services. It's latest version, the VH5, has seats that face each other and no steering wheel or pedals. Since the car has no need for a driver, it is actually bi-directional, able to go full speed in both forward and reverse.

This bold strategy is also more expensive and time-consuming. In addition to developing and testing autonomous driving and building autonomous ridesharing services, it also needs to design and build unique vehicles. This strategy proved to be its downfall. It simply could not raise the amount of capital required. That's why it needed to be acquired, and Amazon was the best fit because it has deep pockets.

Zoox has been testing its autonomous driving technology in first-generation test vehicles (retrofitted Toyota SUVs) in Las Vegas and San Francisco. According to reports filed with the state of California, Zoox drove approximately 67,000 autonomous miles in the state in 2019, which was more than many, but it was much less than the leaders. Waymo drove more than 1.4 million miles and GM Cruise drove more than 800,000.

Why Was Zoox Only Worth $1.2 billion?

Zoox had previously raised almost $1 billion with a reported market valuation of approximately $3 billion in its last round, yet it sold to Amazon for $1.2 billion. This gets back to the problem that Zoox's bold strategy was just too expensive. Most likely, it would need another $1 - $2 billion to complete its autonomous technology and second-generation vehicle. It then would need as much as $8 - $10 billion to contract with a manufacturer to build its initial fleet of 100,000 autonomous vehicles, although debt financing would most likely be available for that.

The additional capital simply wasn't available to Zoox right now. Sure, Uber raised almost $15 billion before it went public, but it's now valued at $50 billion, which is not much more than when the last $10 billion was invested. Some potential investors, like auto companies, don't have the financial resources now and are already far along on their own AV development. Big investors, like Softbank, are already invested with other ARS companies.

In addition, the nature of private investments like the ones in Zook set high valuations for subsequent rounds. When it became apparent that Zoox would require a couple of billion dollars of additional investment, the valuation on the last round was most likely a problem. If investors were willing to invest, but at a much lower valuation, then the investors in the last round would have to take a significant write-down, or they would force down the equity of previous rounds. By selling the company, rather than raising more investment at a lower valuation, the investors in the final round may have been able to get back much of their investment, depending on the terms.

Most likely, Amazon was the most appropriate investor, and it wanted to control the business completely, and not be a passive investor. It has deep pockets and the market potential for autonomous ride services (ARS) is a big opportunity, which Amazon could use to keep accelerating its future growth.

What Is The ARS Market Again

I've discussed the market for autonomous ride services (ARS) in previous articles (Waymo Has A First-To-Market Advantage In Autonomous Ride Services), but it's worth summarizing again here. ARS is ridesharing without a driver. It is expected to be much less expensive, much more profitable, and more convenient because it doesn't require a driver. Like ridesharing, it will be a local business. Fleets of autonomous vehicles will provide ARS in selected municipal areas. For example, a fleet of 100,000 AVs eventually could provide ARS in the greater Phoenix area, serving about 7.5% of the transportation needs. It's not like the auto industry, which is global.

ARS will eventually displace most of the ridesharing market, which is why Uber and Lyft have an interest in expanding into this market. It will also displace some private car ownership since most cars are expensive and sit idle 90-95% of the time.

ARS has the potential to be an enormous market opportunity. In estimates from my previous articles taken from Autonomous Vehicles: Opportunities, Strategies, and Disruptions, the market could be more than $75 billion by 2025 and more than $750 billion by 2030.

Who Will Amazon Compete With In ARS?

Currently, Waymo (GOOG) is the leader in the ARS market. It has driven more than 20 million test miles autonomously in 25 different cities, and it has driven another 10 billion miles in simulation. It currently operates its ARS, Waymo One, in the Phoenix area with 1,000- 1,500 trips per day prior to the suspension of activities for COVID-19. Notably, approximately 10% of these are fully autonomous without any safety driver on board.

In recognition of the anticipated capital needs to build autonomous vehicle fleets, Waymo is now operated as a separate company and has received $3 billion of outside investment at a rumored valuation of $30 billion, which some analysts thought was low.

GM Cruise (GM) is currently the number two competitor in this new market. Cruise has done significant testing and is expected to release its ARS in the later part of 2021. Cruise is also a separate business, which has raised more than $6 billion at a rumored valuation of $19 billion, although some analysts estimate that the business could be worth more than $40 billion eventually. In 2020, GM Cruise had approximately 1,750 employees and was spending about $1 billion per year, which is why it has $2.3 billion available. This is approximately twice the number of employees at Zoox, as a comparison.

Ford (F), through Ford Autonomus Vehicles LLC, has also announced its intentions to compete in this market. This ARS is also operated as a separate business with outside investment. Ford intends to release its new autonomous ARS vehicles in 2022.

Uber (UBER) and Lyft (LYFT) also have intentions to provide ARS to replace their ridesharing business. They have no choice. Both are exploring combinations of developing their own AV technology and doing partnerships. Given the amount of investment required to produce safe autonomous driving technology and to build ARS fleets, it's unlikely either can do it one their own.

Apple (AAPL) is the wildcard in this market. It has been developing autonomous driving technology (Project Titan) for many years. Although it hasn't disclosed its intentions (it never does), legal filings indicated that it has 2,700 core employees working on this project. It has also disclosed testing in California and filed for more than 100 patents on autonomous driving. Most likely it has invested more than a couple of billion in this technology. I previously wrote about my expectations for Apple (Deciphering Apple's Autonomous Vehicle Strategy).

Anticipating that someone will say that I neglected Tesla, let me say that I don't see it as being a major competitor in ARS for two reasons. First, its technology may not be sufficiently autonomous for ARS. Second, ARS will be a fleet-based market, not a swarm of Tesla owners sending their cars out for passengers. Tesla makes excellent semi-autonomous cars. I own one and love it, but it won't be an ARS autonomous vehicle.

Interestingly, this new and enormous market for ARS could become a battle of the three technology titans: Alphabet (GOOG), Amazon (AMZN), and Apple(AAPL)!

Amazon's ARS Opportunity

The acquisition of Zoox is a terrific strategic move for Amazon. There aren't many really big new markets for large tech companies like Amazon, Alphabet, and Apple that can provide the growth they desire. ARS is one of the biggest, if not the biggest.

By acquiring Zoox, Amazon has catapulted into the middle of the development cycle. It is too late, risky, and more expensive to start now to develop its own autonomous driving technology. The acquisition cost $1.2 billion, and it will need to invest another $1-$2 billion to complete development and testing, prior to building out its fleet. Zoox's strategy of a purpose-built second-generation AV will also take a little longer than Waymo and Cruise, but that's OK. There will still be plenty of market opportunities.

Even some "back of the envelope" calculations indicate that if Amazon/Zoox can catch up to Waymo and Cruise by investing another $1 -$2 billion in the short-run, then it could have an enterprise value of $30 - $40 billion. A meaningful share of a $750 billion market by 2030 could be a big boost to Amazon's market value.

Another way of looking at this opportunity is to compare Amazon's strategic expansion with Zoox to Amazon's previous expansion with AWS. AWS was launched in 2012, although there was prior development. By 2017, AWS had $17.46 billion in annual revenue, and last year, AWS had grown to $35 billion and accounted for 80% of Amazon’s profits. Some analysts estimate that AWS could account for as much as $400 - $500 billion of Amazon's market value of $1.3 trillion. Amazon has a clear path forward to growing it's Zoox ARS business to more than $35 billion in revenue in the next 5-6 years with only a 10% - 20% market share. Since this new market will be growing rapidly and is expected to be profitable, would that add an equivalent value to Amazon?

Waymo Has A First-To-Market Advantage In Autonomous Ride Services

Originally Published in Seeking Alpha Mar. 2, 2020 11:22 AM ET

Summary

  • Autonomous vehicles will be launched within a year to provide autonomous ride services (ARS).

  • It now is clear that Waymo (Google) will be the first major company to bring this service to the market.

  • Waymo will have substantial first-to-market competitive advantages that will enable it to achieve significant market share in what is expected to be a very large new market.

  • The ARS market in the US is projected to be $100 billion by 2025 and more than $750 billion by 2030.

  • This has the potential of eventually valuing Waymo as a standalone business at as much or more than Google today.

I've been writing articles about autonomous vehicles on Seeking Alpha for almost two years, and I continue to believe that 2021 will be the year for the introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs). It is now very clear that the first market opportunity for AVs will be Autonomous Ride Services (ARS) and not AVs sold at retail. It is now also clear that Waymo (NASDAQ:GOOG) (NASDAQ:GOOGL) will be the first to market and can establish substantial competitive advantages. In this article, I'll explain why ARS is coming within a year, refresh my projections of the ARS market, explain Waymo's strategy, highlight the strategies of potential competitors, and consider the significance of its first-to-market competitive advantages. First, let's review autonomous ride services and its market opportunity.

Autonomous Ride Services

Autonomous ride services is essentially Uber without a driver. It will be provided by fleets of autonomous vehicles based in selected metropolitan areas that offer trips to certain destinations along predefined routes. The autonomous driving technology used by these vehicles is based on LIDAR and high-definition maps that position the vehicle precisely on the map. Initially, the destinations and routes may be somewhat limited, but those will increase rapidly. A passenger will summon an autonomous ride using an app similar to Uber (NYSE:UBER) or Lyft (NASDAQ:LYFT), and the app will identify if that route is available.

The cost advantages of ARS over ridesharing are significant. In a previous article, I explained these cost differences: Uber Must Have Autonomous Ride Services. It's the classic case of a technology/capital-intensive business model replacing a labor-intensive one. Ridesharing companies like Uber and Lyft struggle to achieve breakeven on a typical trip at about $16, but ARS will be very profitable at about half that price.

Almost all companies developing autonomous vehicles have shifted their strategies to focus initially on developing autonomous vehicles for fleets providing autonomous ride services, instead of developing autonomous vehicles for the retail market. Most of these also intend to introduce their own autonomous ride services instead of selling fleets. The introduction of autonomous vehicles sold at retail has been delayed until 2025 or later.

The reasons that ARS will be the first market for autonomous vehicles are now obvious. The first generation of autonomous driving technology will be done using high-definition maps to place a vehicle precisely in its surroundings. This limits these vehicles to predefined routes and locations, which is perfectly fine for ARS. The app used to request an autonomous ride will be able to identify if the route can be served. ARS won't serve all routes, but will serve the 80%-90% most popular routes, and that works well.

ARS will be provided by fleets, most likely several thousand autonomous vehicles in each fleet, each serving a specific metropolitan area. This fleet-based strategy enables more control and increased safety. A fleet operations center will maintain the vehicles, work with local municipal authorities, and communicate with passengers when necessary. In the first stage (2021-2025), ARS will focus on selected municipalities, most like those in the Southern and Western parts of the country where the weather is favorable, road systems are easier, and local governments permit autonomous vehicles. Again, these favors ARS because ramping up these services will be capital intensive and require time to map local areas and initiate local fleet operations centers.

So, why do I believe that autonomous ride services are coming within a year? I realize that there are many skeptics who say that it will be a decade or more. First, the testing of autonomous vehicles has accelerated dramatically and has proven to be safe. For example, Waymo has driven its autonomous vehicles for 20 million miles without any significant accidents. Thirty-five companies did testing in California last year, driving autonomous vehicles 2.8 million miles, a 40% increase over 2018, without any significant accidents. Several companies are testing their autonomous ride services with actual passengers requesting rides, although they have a safety driver on board.

Secondly, there is a large pipeline of vehicles being prepared for autonomous ride services. Waymo has 80,000 vehicles in its pipeline, and Ford (NYSE:F) and GM (NYSE:GM) have stated their intentions to build tens of thousands by 2021.

Finally, Waymo is already providing autonomous rides to a limited base of customers without a safety driver on board. (See Video) I expect that it will expand this service this year and fully launch it in the Scottsdale area by 2021, if not sooner. GM has indicated that it will introduce its ARS in San Francisco next year, and Ford has recommitted to having its autonomous ride service available next year also.

Autonomous Ride Services Market

ARS will be a significant new market, perhaps one of the largest new markets of this century. This is why companies are investing heavily. Let's look at some updated forecasts.

https://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2020/2/17/30457345-15819655934672973_origin.png

The projection is 30,000 autonomous ride service vehicles by 2021, generating more than $4.5 billion in revenue. For those of you interested in the math, here it is. Each ARS vehicle is projected to generate approximately $150,000 in revenue per year, based on 50 paid trips per day at about $8.75 per trip, operating 350 days in a year.

$8.75 per 7-mile trip is about half of the price of ridesharing today, so ARS can quickly take market share. ARS can be profitable at this price. I estimate profit contribution at about $2.25 per trip, while ridesharing is still not profitable.

These 30,000 ARS vehicles will generate about $4.5 billion in revenue. To put this into perspective, this equates to an insignificant percentage of total miles driven (about 0.1%). The ARS market will grow rapidly as more fleets are introduced into new municipal areas and the number of autonomous vehicles in each fleet increases. By the end of Stage 1 in 2025, approximately 750,000 autonomous vehicles will be in use to provide ARS, generating almost $100 billion in revenue. At this point, ARS will seriously cannibalize the ridesharing market and provide about 2% of the miles driven in the US, without expanding beyond more than 30-50 metropolitan areas in Southern and Western part of the country.

These limited metropolitan areas have the potential to provide a sufficient market for autonomous ride services in the first stage through 2025. For example, the greater Phoenix metropolitan area could support 100,000 autonomous ride services vehicles by providing only 7.5% of the miles traveled. Other metropolitan areas in Florida such as Miami, Collier County, and Orlando can support even more. Municipalities in California and Texas will enable many more metropolitan markets.

Waymo's Strategy

Waymo, Google at the time and now Alphabet was one of the first to work on autonomous vehicle technology. It has invested more and has made more progress than others. Waymo's autonomous vehicles have driven 20 million miles on public roads in 25 cities. Additionally, it has "driven" tens of billions of miles through computer simulations. Just think about that for a minute: 20 million miles of autonomous driving with no serious accidents. It's ready to release its autonomous vehicles.

Waymo is using 600 Fiat Chrysler (NYSE:FCAU) Pacifica hybrid minivans for its testing. It has also announced that it plans to acquire 62,000 more and also purchase 20,000 Jaguar I-PACE electric vehicles. It built a factory, along with Magna, in Southeast Michigan to retrofit these vehicles to be autonomous. If Waymo puts these 82,000 autonomous vehicles into service by 2023, it would represent more than 50% of the forecast in the table above.

The Waymo One app enables riders to request a pick-up and drop-off location, similar to Uber and Lyft. If it is a route that it serves, then it provides an autonomous ride. Waymo has been cautious in testing its ride services. It launched an early rider program in April 2017 for 400 people in Arizona, serving a 100-square-mile area. These rides were autonomous but had a safety driver on board. Waymo is increasing the number of people served and the area covered. At the end of last year, Waymo started providing autonomous rides without a safety driver.

Waymo has also continued testing in California. In 2019, it had 148 autonomous vehicles that drove almost 1.5 million miles without any serious accidents. It recorded about two dozen incident reports, but these were almost all caused by other vehicles at very low speeds, with only minor damage.

Waymo has also begun targeting other municipal areas. In September 2019, it announced that it would start testing and launching an ARS in Florida, beginning with Miami but also adding routes to Fort Meyers and Orlando. Then, it announced that it was developing detailed ARS maps for Los Angeles.

Waymo's ARS Competitors

Even though Waymo will have a first-to-market advantage, there will be a lot of competition. ARS is a very large market opportunity, and other companies also are targeting it. Let's look briefly at some of the other expected competitors for the US market and their strategies.

I currently rank GM Cruise Automation as the second company behind Waymo. It intends to launch its autonomous ride services in San Francisco. Cruise currently has a fleet of more than 200 autonomous vehicles in San Francisco, using its Cruise Anywhere app to schedule rides. In 2019, its autonomous vehicles drove more than 800,000 miles in California. Cruise recently unveiled the Cruise Origin, a six-person taxi purpose-built for autonomous ride services in urban areas such as San Francisco. Cruise is expected to launch its ARS in 2021. SoftBank and Honda have invested in Cruise Automation, giving it a value of approximately $15 billion (almost a third of GM's valuation). Most likely, Cruise will be spun off as a separate company.

Ford Autonomous Vehicles LLC has made it clear that its initial strategy is focused on ARS. It has been testing its AVs in Austin, Miami, and Washington DC. Some reports claim that Ford plans to build 100,000 ARS vehicles starting in 2021. Its original strategy was to provide AVs to companies who would provide ARS, but that changed when the major players in the industry realized they needed to have control over their customers. Unlike most other competitors, Ford expects to use hybrid autonomous vehicles instead of fully electric. It believes this approach works best because the autonomous platform drains battery life and AVs for ARS are more profitable with less downtime for charging.

Aptiv (NYSE:APTV), now a joint venture with Hyundai Motor Group (OTCPK:HYMLF), uses technology based on its 2017 acquisition of nuTonomy. In May of 2018, Aptiv launched its ARS service in Las Vegas with a fleet of 30 BMWs in conjunction with Lyft. Now, that fleet has completed over 100,000 autonomous rides with 75 BMW 5 Series sedans.

Uber's strategy is to build a very large, although most likely unprofitable, ridesharing business and then convert its customer base to a profitable autonomous ride services business. ARS will cannibalize ridesharing because of its highly favorable economic advantages. So, Uber has no choice but to move to ARS. Unfortunately, Uber is in an unsettling position for ARS. It is developing its own autonomous driving technology but suffered a major setback with a tragic fatal accident on March 18, 2018. It then suspended all testing but recently restarted its program. Uber's initial target markets for ARS appear to be Dallas and Washington DC, in addition to its testing in Pittsburg.

Like Uber, Lyft is at risk of cannibalization from ARS. Lyft's ARS strategy is different from Uber's in that it has a two-pronged approach: both developing its own technology and partnering with others. It has preliminary pilot partnerships with Waymo and Aptiv, but it remains to be seen how these partnerships will work out since everyone wants to control the customer. Lyft's investment in developing its own autonomous technology doesn't seem up to many of the others. Lyft started testing its AVs in California last year with 19 autonomous vehicles, which drove about 43,000 miles.

Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL) is the wildcard in this market. Apple has been very secretive about its autonomous vehicle program, code-named Project Titan, but as I've written previously (Deciphering Apple's Autonomous Vehicle Strategy), there is a lot of evidence that it will enter the ARS market. It has invested significantly and has filed hundreds of autonomous-driving patents. At the end of 2018, as part of legal action against a former employee, Apple claimed that it had 5,000 employees who were disclosed on its autonomous driving project. Most likely, Apple will be a follower, letting other companies create the market before it enters, and then come into the market with a high-quality service and second-generation autonomous vehicles. I now project that Apple will be a 2023 entrant into the ARS market.

Finally, I'm sure many people are wondering about Tesla's (NASDAQ:TSLA) promise of the Tesla Network, a fleet of customer-owned and company-owned Teslas to provide autonomous ride services. Even though I own a Tesla and think it is the best semi-autonomous vehicle, its autonomous technology platform works well for highway driving, but it is not yet viable for municipal driving where frequent turns are required. Also, the Tesla Network business model for providing swarms of autonomous vehicles for ride services is not workable.

Waymo's First-to-Market Advantage

The importance of a first-to-market competitive advantage varies. It can be substantial in some cases but not worth the early risk in others. With ARS, Waymo will have substantial first-to-market competitive advantages.

The initial obvious first-to-market advantage is the development of autonomous driving technology, primarily software. Autonomous driving software is very complex and takes time to develop and test. Waymo started development earlier and has invested more than other competitors. It has been testing its software longer and much more extensively. Waymo's 20 million miles of testing on public roads is well ahead of any others. While competitors may be able to learn a little from observing Waymo's AVs in action, there isn't much they can do to reduce the software-development cycle, short of stealing it (which Uber tried to do).

The second advantage, and maybe the most important one, is that ARS is a regional, not global, market with services provided in selected municipalities. This is very different from other high-tech products. Once a competitor enters a specific municipal market and captures a significant major share, others will be discouraged from entering the same market and trying to displace the incumbent. Waymo appears poised right now to enter several of the most lucrative municipal markets and could secure these markets before others even get started.

Ride-request and dispatch, as well as fleet management, are important operational functions for autonomous ride services. These are often taken for granted, but they are difficult to develop and perfect the customer experience. Here again, Waymo has a first-to-market advantage with its Waymo One app and its extensive customer experience in Arizona. Competitors, except possibly Uber and Lyft because they already have ridesharing apps, are behind in these operational functions.

Waymo depends on others to manufacture its basic vehicles, but its strategy compensates for this deficiency. It has ordered 80,000 basic vehicles from Fiat Chrysler and Jaguar to customize in its factory in Michigan. This enables it to get the first-generation of ARS autonomous vehicles to market faster, but this could be a competitive disadvantage when the ARS market shifts to second-generation autonomous vehicles designed specifically for autonomous ride services without any driver controls.

Experience really matters in this market. With more experience, a company's ARS will be safer and able to cover more unique situations. Also, it can scale the operations side of the ARS business more effectively.

There are always some risks to being the first to market. In this case, it's the risk of a fatal accident. While AVs will be much safer than human drivers, there still will be some accidents, and the early ones will be overblown by the press and those who are fighting AVs.

Waymo's Potential Market Share and Revenue

With its first-to-market advantage, Waymo could achieve significant market share in Stage 1 of the ARS market. Assuming it deploys the 80,000 autonomous vehicles by 2023, it would have about 50% of a projected $23 billion market. While that is not significant relative to Alphabet's total revenue, it could be a very valuable asset. At about $12 billion in revenue in 2023 and growing rapidly, Waymo would be similar in size to Uber today, which is currently valued at $60 billion. However, Waymo should be very profitable, and Uber is currently losing money.

By 2025, Waymo's share of the ARS market will most likely decline as competitors expand their fleets and enter into more municipal markets. With a 35% to 40% market share, its revenues could be $35-40 billion by 2025.

The ARS market will continue to grow rapidly through Stage 2, which goes through 2030. My projections are that the market could reach $750 billion. By this time, there could be 5 million ARS autonomous vehicles throughout the US that account for up to 15% of the total miles driven. Waymo could still be holding a 25-30% market share, giving it revenue of approximately $200 billion.

At some point during this growth, it would not be surprising for Alphabet to spin off Waymo as an independent company. This seems to be the trend with GM and Ford doing this as well as others. It makes sense because ARS is a very different business, and it will require a lot of capital.

I won't speculate on forecasting its potential valuation, but as the market leader with barriers to entry in a huge rapidly growing market, it could possibly be worth as much as the rest of Google.

Disclosure: I am/we are long GOOG, AAPL, GM. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Lessons Learned from the Fatal Uber AV Accident

Lessons Learned from the Fatal Uber AV Accident

Michael E. McGrath

Author: Autonomous Vehicles: Opportunities, Strategies, and Disruptions

The tragic death of a pedestrian hit by an Uber autonomous vehicles (AV) on March 18th provides some important lessons. 

Elaine Herzberg, 49, was walking her bicycle far from the crosswalk on a four-lane road in the Phoenix suburb of Tempe about 10 PM on Sunday March 18, 2018 when she was struck by an Uber autonomous vehicle traveling at about 38 miles per hour, police said. The Uber Volvo XC90 SUV test vehicle was in autonomous mode with an operator behind the wheel. 

 “The pedestrian was outside of the crosswalk. As soon as she walked into the lane of traffic she was struck,” Tempe Police Sergeant Ronald Elcock told reporters at a news conference. The video footage shows the Uber vehicle was traveling in the rightmost of two lanes. Herzberg was moving from left to right, crossing from the center median to the curb on the far right. 

There are many lessons to be learned from this tragic accident, some obvious and some more subtle. 

1. A human driver would not have prevented the accident.

This was not an example demonstrating that an autonomous vehicle (AV) is less safe than a human driver.  "It's very clear it would have been difficult to avoid this collision in any kind of mode (autonomous or human-driven) based on how she came from the shadows right into the roadway," stated the local police chief. Based on the AVs onboard video recorder, the pedestrian appeared suddenly from the dark and was visible for only 1 second before impact, and she didn’t appear to notice the car even though the headlights were shining directly on her. It takes a human 2 seconds to react instantly to a situation like this. 

So, the first lesson is that this isn’t a case where an AV failed to perform as well and as safely as a human driver. The first level of standard is that AV must perform as well as human drivers, but we expect more from AVs. 

2. We expect more from AVs than human drivers.

This is potentially a case where an AV should have outperformed a human drive. There was no other traffic around, and nothing to obstruct the other sensors in addition to the video from viewing Herzberg. By the time she came into view of the camera, she had crossed the left lane and was halfway across the right lane, having moved at least 20 feet from the median. She was also walking her bicycle across the road, not dashing out in front of traffic. That means she was out in clear space on the road for at least a couple of seconds. The Volvo XC90s that Uber is using for development are equipped with cameras, radar and lidar sensors. Radar and lidar are capable of “seeing” their surroundings in complete darkness and should have detected Herzberg’s presence in the roadway. The Volvo was traveling at 38 mph, a speed from which it could stop in no more than 60-70 feet, or steer around Herzberg, to the left, without hitting her. 

The reason why the Uber AV failed to detect her in time is still undetermined. It could have been a blind spot in its lidar sensors or a failure to characterize the data properly, or possible something else. Eventually the data logs will most likely provide an answer. In any case, it will be used to prevent any similar accidents in the future.

3. Unlike human drivers, AVs will learn from this accident and avoid similar ones in the future.

While a human driver involved in this type of accident may learn from it personally, the other hundreds of millions of drivers won’t. This is a big difference between human drivers and AVs. Every AV will learn from this experience and be more cautious in the same conditions. This is because the software, which is the brains of the AV, will put this case in its memory to be called on in any similar circumstances. The sensors on AVs will be validated to detect and properly characterize similar objects.

This ability to distribute learning will make AVs increasingly safer over time. Within a few days after the accident, I expect that all companies developing AVs have verified this case situation and made sure that they would have detected the pedestrian and taken corrective action. It is unlikely that a similar accident will occur with any AV in the future.

4. Humans are unpredictable and that behavior needs to be included in an AV’s software.

The victim in this case, appeared to walk directly in front of the vehicle without noticing it. She wasn’t in a crosswalk, and she directly put herself in jeopardy.  6,000 pedestrians were killed in the United States in 2016, and most these were not using crosswalks. AVs need to anticipate unpredictable human behavior and build random behavior into their artificial intelligence.

5. Video sensors alone may not be able to get the results we expect from AVs.

The video from the accident showed that the vehicle did not have time to react once the video camera saw the woman. Humans rely primarily on what they see (video), but AVs have other sensors. While AVs will be better in reacting to what they see with video than humans, especially when the human driver is distracted or impaired, this case shows the importance of AVs being able to detect more than what they see. 

There is some disagreement on the ability of different types of video to identify the pedestrian earlier, but it certainly raises the issue that video alone may not be sufficient. Most AVs use multiple sensors and fuse together what they all detect, but some, especially Tesla, rely primarily on video sensing – seeing what the human eye sees.

6. AV developers may want to consider adding thermal sensors to the AV sensor package to distinguish humans and animals from other similar objects.

An AV cannot react to all objects in motion. Slamming on the breaks when a bag is blown across the road can cause an unnecessary accident. But if the object is a human or an animal, breaking should be initiated. The difference is the thermal heat signature of objects. Humans and animals on or near the road create far more heat than their surroundings.

Thermal sensors for autonomous vehicles can provide additional data could be used to identify an object as human or animal.

Thermal imaging is particularly important when used as night vision. A thermal imaging sensor can see further ahead and provide more time to react than video. It can distinguish between a moving object on the side of the road. In this case, a thermal imaging camera or sensor would have identified the woman as a human moving across the road in the dark. 

Currently most AVs don’t have thermal sensing cameras, but perhaps it’s time to add these to the sensor package. This will require substantial reprogramming of the sensor fusion software, but learning for this experience may justify it.

7. The failures of AVs will be publicized, but the successes won’t be noticed.

A headline that you won’t see is: “Autonomous vehicle avoids hitting pedestrian that would have been killed by a human driver”. Successes aren’t anything more than entries into a database for the artificial intelligence guiding AVs. They don’t make news stories. Unfortunately, this tragic accident could have been simply an addition to the database as “detected and avoided hitting pedestrian crossing road with bike.”

So, we need to expect that all the incident reports in the press will be overwhelming negative, since only the negative cases are newsworthy. Skewing news like this may cause people to be more cautious and may incite regulation of AVs, but in the end, it won’t stop the advances because the unknown successes will surely outweigh the failures or limitations. 

8. There may be a difference in the accident avoidance among different AV developers.

This may be a harsh reality: some AVs may be better and safer than others because of the way they are designed and developed. Company A’s AVs may be safer than Company B’s. We already saw a glimpse of this when Waymo claimed that its AVs would have spotted and try to avoid the pedestrian in the Uber accident. That may or may not be the case, but there will be differences among AVs by developer. 

There are some reports that Uber reduced the number of sensors on its AVs when it went from earlier Ford Fusion versions with seven lidars, seven radars, and 20 cameras to the newest Volvo test vehicle with one lidar, 10 radars and seven cameras. The reduction in sensors may have been done because Uber thought it had overdone the number of sensors originally. It’s possible that the reduction in sensors may have caused blind spots in the sensor coverage. Waymo AVs currently use six lidar sensors and GM’s AVs use five. 

How will people react to this? Will some sort of safety record, shape the way people buy AVs or select an autonomous ride service for a trip? Will Uber be forced to withdraw or significantly delay its entry into autonomous ride services? Maybe something like verified senor coverage may be appropriate for government regulation? 

9. AV accidents, unlike human accidents, will be factually documented.

The facts of the Uber accident illustrated a marked difference in the way accident facts are reported. With the onboard computer recording all the sensor and control readings, that facts are known exactly. The vehicle was traveling 38 MPH in a 35 MPH zone. There was a complete video recording of the pedestrian entering the road as soon as she was visible. The time from being visible to the time of impact was 1 second. With AVs, there won’t be any discrepancies from drivers and witnesses. The exact facts will be known. 

10. A backup human driver can’t react quickly enough in these situations. 

The backup driver in this case appeared to be distracted, but nevertheless, it takes 2 seconds for a human to react to that type of situation, and there was only 1 second between the victim becoming visible and impact. SAE Level 3, Conditional Automation, sets the expectation that a driver should be able to respond appropriately to a request to intervene. This example illustrates that a request to intervene is not practical in situations like this where an instant response is required. It is only practical for situations such as encountering an unusual traffic situation or road blockage. This is the reason why some AV developers are skipping SAE Level 3. 

11. t may be time to increase the focus on pedestrians using crosswalks.

6,000 pedestrians were killed in the United States in 2016, an increase of 27% from 2007. Elaine Herzberg was struck and killed by Uber’s autonomous vehicle when she attempted to walk her bike across an eight-lane street, crossing about 100 yards from the crosswalk. Herzberg walked her bike from the center median across two vehicular lanes when she is struck by the vehicle. The large median at the site of the crash has signs warning people not to cross mid-block and to use the crosswalk to the north at Curry Road instead. But the median also has a brick pathway cutting through the desert landscaping that accommodates people who do cross at that site.

Arizona has the highest rate of pedestrian deaths in the nation. Ten pedestrians were killed in the state in the previous week. Experts have long attributed the state’s high rate of pedestrian deaths to exceptionally wide streets that are engineered to move cars fast and do not provide adequate safety infrastructure for people who are on foot or bike.

This accident focuses attention not just on AVs but also on the general safety of pedestrians. In the future, AVs may avoid hitting pedestrians more than vehicles controlled by humans, but it is still a better safety measure to discourage pedestrians from crossing roads outside of crosswalks.

Learning from experiences, especially tragic ones like this, is critical to the advancement of new technology. Autonomous vehicles will profoundly change transportation as we currently know it, and in the process, significantly improve lifestyles and create major new industries. However, it’s important to be implemented carefully.

Google Tips Its Hand on Its Autonomous Vehicle Strategy, And It Will Be Big

Google Tips Its Hand on Its Autonomous Vehicle Strategy, And It Will Be Big

Michael E. McGrath

Originally published by Seeking Alpha on May 21, 2018 

Summary

  • Waymo, a subsidiary of Alphabet, announced its plans to purchase 20,000 vehicles from Jaguar, which shows its autonomous vehicle strategy.

  • It is entering the new market for autonomous ride services (ARS) and not going to sell cars or license its technology.

  • ARS is expected to be an enormous new market: $150 billion by 2025 and $750 billion by 2030 in the US.

  • Waymo/Alphabet could achieve $50 billion in ARS revenue by 2025 and possibly $75-$150 billion by 2030, potentially overshadowing its current business.

  • But there will be a lot of competition in the ARS market, including Uber, Lyft, some of the car manufacturers, and possibly Apple.

Waymo/Alphabet (GOOG) (NASDAQ:GOOGL) recently announced that it plans to buy 20,000 Jaguar Land Rover electric I-Pace SUVs and modify them to be a major part of its autonomous ride services fleet by 2020. With this announcement, Waymo has signaled significant elements of its autonomous vehicle strategy, providing insight into what could be an enormous opportunity.

While it is difficult to characterize major new markets before they are even created, long-term investors who can do this accurately can establish early investment positions.

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) will create some enormous investment opportunities, while also threatening some well-established companies. AVs will create two primary markets at the highest level (not including the markets for what goes into an AV): retail sales of AVs and the use of AVs in Autonomous Ride Services (ARS). Of these two, ARS will be the first and the most exciting new opportunity.

Autonomous ride services are sometimes referred to as mobility or transportation as a service, on-demand rides, or the passenger economy. Essentially it is the autonomous vehicle replacement for the ridesharing services from Uber (UBER), Lyft (LYFT) and others, but at a much lower price and increased convenience. 

Autonomous Ride services

This move by Waymo clarifies that its autonomous vehicle strategy is autonomous ride services, and it's not trying to build and sell autonomous vehicles for the retail market or license its technology. So, everyone confused about its strategy can now focus on ARS. 

ARS is projected to be a very large market, and it will be the first market for autonomous vehicles. At this point, it looks like Waymo has an early lead into this market.

This move confirms that autonomous ride services will be fleet-based. Waymo is launching its first fleet in Arizona, thanks to a compatible regulatory environment and good weather. I estimate that initial fleet sizes will range from 500 to 1,000-plus vehicles per municipal area, then increasing over time as ARS is more broadly accepted. The initial commitment for 20,000 I-Pace SUVs implies that Waymo will target many more municipal areas by 2020.

This purchase also shows that the first-generation ARS vehicles will be retrofitted versions of currently mass-produced cars, probably luxury SUVs, made by traditional manufacturers. This makes sense in order to get to market fast without the risk of building entirely new cars. Waymo, which was already testing about 600 vehicles, including the Prius, and the Chrysler Pacifica, also has potential orders for several thousand more Chrysler minivans. So, the size of its pilot fleet could be even larger than 20,000 vehicles. It hasn’t disclosed where it will acquire/manufacture the autonomous vehicle technology platform or where it will retrofit the vehicles.

The I-Pace, launched earlier this year by Jaguar, is a logical choice for Waymo. It’s fully electric, with a range of 240 miles. I estimate that 50 trips per day will equate to approximately 350 miles, so the battery will need to be recharged. Also, complex computing and sensors will drain the battery, reducing the range even further. Jaguar advertises an 80 percent battery top-up in 40 minutes, and Waymo believes that it can get through the peak duty cycle of a rush hour, and then do a quick top-off charge to get through the rest of the day.

I expect that second-generation ARS vehicles will be custom designed for passenger convenience instead of retrofitting existing vehicles, probably starting in 2021.

Google’s $50 Billion ARS Opportunity

Waymo believes that the 20,000 new I-Pace vehicles will be able to provide a million trips per day. Interestingly, this is the same estimate of 50 trips per day per vehicle that I derived independently. Let's look at how this translates into a revenue opportunity.

20,000 vehicles may be a large pilot, but it illustrates the sheer magnitude of the opportunity. I estimate that a typical autonomous ride services vehicle making 50 trips per day will generate approximately $150,000 in revenue per year. This assumes an average trip of seven miles at a cost of $1.25 per mile and usage of 350 days per year. To put this in perspective, this is an estimate of only $8.75 per trip compared an estimated cost of $14-$15 for a comparable trip on Uber today. 

With this estimate of $150,000 per ARS vehicle per year, Waymo's initial fleet of 20,000 ARS vehicles could generate approximately $3 billion in annual revenue by 2020. Waymo currently has no revenue, just a significant investment expense.

An incremental $3 billion in revenue from this pilot by 2020 will have only a small impact on Alphabet’s current revenue, which was $110 billion in 2017. However, this is just an initial pilot. If this pilot turns out to be 5% of the total rollout by 2025, then incremental annual ARS revenue for Waymo alone could be $50 to $60 billion, and that is very significant.

I estimate that the total market for autonomous ride services in the United States will be approximately 1 million vehicles and $150 billion by 2025. While this is just an estimate because the adoption rate by ARS remains to be proven, it represents only 3.5% of the miles driven in the United States. It’s feasible (but still to be determined) that Waymo, who now appears to have a lead, could capture a third of the ARS market and gain about $50 to $60 billion in new revenue.

By 2030, I estimate that the ARS market, in the United States alone, will deploy about 5 million ARS vehicles and generate more than $750 billion in revenue. This assumes that approximately 15% of the miles driven in the US are served by ARS. If this happens, then ARS will be one of the largest markets. A 10% share would be $75 billion in revenue, and 20% would be $150 billion. If the market emerges as I predict, and Waymo captures a significant market share, then it could add $75-$150 billion in revenue, overshadowing Alphabet's traditional business.

The economics of ARS are very attractive, even at a cost to riders of a dollar per mile, which is less than half the cost of typical Uber rides today. At this rate per mile, gross profit margins, after the cost of maintaining the vehicles and fleet operations centers, could be as high as 50%. With the creation of such an enormous new and exceptionally profitable market, Waymo will have a lot of competition.

Competition

I expect that other competitors, such as Uber, Lyft, GM (GM), Ford (F), Mercedes (OTCPK:DDAIF), and Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL) (so far undeclared) will also go aggressively after the ARS market. Some traditional car manufactures, like Jaguar and Chrysler, may provide "dumb cars" to technology companies that will retrofit them into autonomous vehicles. This may not be the case for all, however. Ford, GM, and Mercedes have stated their strategies to develop a complete autonomous ride service platform using their own autonomous capabilities.

Uber and Lyft have the advantage of existing market penetration with their ridesharing apps, so their users can continue to request a ride from them, but it will be autonomous. Waymo doesn't have a popular ridesharing app, so it will need to introduce and promote one very soon for its pilot markets. It can leverage the uniqueness of its first-to-market ARS service and perhaps its Android operating system.

Uber has declared that it will provide ARS very soon but has recently run into difficulties with its early tests. While it has a leadership advantage in ridesharing, it appears to be behind Waymo in technology. Nevertheless, it should be an early and strong competitor in ARS. Lyft can also leverage its strong presence in ridesharing to compete in the ARS market. Lyft's strategy is different than Uber's because it hasn't made significant investments in autonomous technologies. So far, it appears to be relying on partnerships with traditional auto manufacturers.

Several of the traditional auto manufacturers, notably Ford, GM, and Mercedes have declared intentions to enter the ARS market, most likely before making autonomous vehicles available at retail. They have made significant investments in autonomous driving technology, and a couple could prove to be strong competitors in the ARS market. Unlike Uber or Lyft, they would use their own autonomous vehicles, most likely in their own fleets. Where they are challenged is in creating a popular ridesharing app for ARS.

Apple is the wildcard in this market. There have been pervasive signs that it is investing substantially in autonomous vehicle technology, although it has not disclosed any intentions. ARS is the most likely use of Apple's autonomous vehicle technology. Licensing its technology is not a significant source of revenue and building and selling AVs at retail is way too risky. It is also an enormous market that Apple most likely cannot ignore. If it does enter this market, it could have significant advantages because it could include its ridesharing app for everyone on an upcoming IOS release, link payments to iTunes accounts, integrate its entertainment capabilities into the vehicles, and leverage its reputation for great user experiences. 

Tesla (TSLA) has stated its intention of competing in the ARS market with the Tesla Network, which is a network for Tesla car owners to make their vehicles available for others to use for a ride. Essentially if owners aren't using their cars, the vehicles can start up, back out of the garage, and go pick up a paying passenger. I believe that reasons for ARS to be fleet-based are so compelling that this type of service won't be very competitive. Tesla will primarily compete in the retail market for AVs. 

Capital Investment Requirements

The capital requirements to compete in the ARS market are significant. It is basically a technology and capital-intensive market replacing a labor-intensive market (ridesharing). (Note: This will probably be the most significant transition of this type in history.) The 20,000 I-Pace SUVs converted to be autonomous will cost Waymo about $2 billion. This assumes approximately $70,000 to $80,000 for the basic I-Pace SUV and approximately $20,000+ for the retrofit to autonomous driving capabilities. Waymo can easily afford this investment by 2020. By 2025 however, if it wants to have a significant share of the ARS market, another investment of $80-$200 billion may be necessary, assuming the cost of an ARS vehicle is reduced to approximately $80,000, and it wants to capture 10%-25% of the estimated 5 million vehicle market by 2030. This capital investment could strain even the financial resources of Alphabet.

The capital investment required to compete in the ARS market will be a challenge for some competitors. Uber and Lyft don't have these financial resources, and will probably need to go public, form partnerships, or be acquired to have access to sufficient capital. The traditional car companies may be able to provide sufficient capital but it will be a stretch, and Apple, of course, has plenty of cash to invest in this market if it chooses. This could be one reason why it is holding onto so much cash. 

Overall Conclusion

Waymo has tipped its hand on its autonomous vehicle strategy and its strategy is autonomous ride services. I project this to be a very large new market, which is why the expected competitors in this market are investing so much in it. The autonomous ride services market could be a $150 billion market by 2025, and if Waymo can capture any significant share, it could dramatically increase its revenue, as could other major competitors in this new market.

The Strategic Transformation of GM And Ford

The Strategic Transformation of GM And Ford

Michael E. McGrath

Originally published in seeking Alpha on Aug. 9, 2018

Summary

  • Autonomous ride services (ARS) is the future of transportation, and it will cannibalize individual car ownership over time.

  • GM and Ford realize this and are making fundamental strategic transitions toward transportation as a service.

  • They each recently created major new business entities to exploit the ARS opportunity separate from their traditional businesses.

  • The ARS market will be an enormous opportunity with several very large companies expected to compete for it.

  • At some time in the future, their ARS businesses may be worth more than their car manufacturing businesses, and they know it.

GM (GM) and Ford (F) are in the early stages of a major transformation to transportation as a service. They will continue to design, manufacture, and sell cars, but are betting their future on autonomous ride services (ARS). Not only is a success in this new market a major opportunity for them, but it may be fundamentally necessary for them to continue as successful companies. In fact, the value of their new ARS business may well exceed the value of their car manufacturing business in the next 3-6 years. Long-term investors in these companies need to be aware of this transition because the company they own today may be very different in the future.

In this, the third of my Seeking Alpha articles on the profound impact of autonomous vehicles, I focus on how these two prominent car manufacturers are addressing this challenge.

Autonomous ride service is the future of transportation, and it will cannibalize individual car ownership over time. This is a technology-based transition like that faced historically by other companies such as Xerox (NYSE:XRX), Digital Equipment, IBM (NYSE:IBM), Polaroid, and others - only it is much larger. Both companies, as well as other car manufacturers, are very aware of the need for this transition and are managing it carefully but aggressively. They know what is at stake and know the risks of doing it correctly.

The advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs) has been discussed for a while, but AV strategies began to change significantly over the last two years as the technologies and opportunities became clearer. I’ve written about this in my previous research over the last two years. It has now become apparent to experts in the industry that autonomous ride services will be the first market for AVs, and that it will become an enormous market. The economic advantages and increased convenience of transportation as a service will displace individual car ownership for many people.

In the U.S. today, the average car sits idle 95% of the time, so ownership is very expensive. ARS vehicles are expected to be utilized 50-60% of the time, and without a driver, the cost of travel will be significantly reduced. Increased use of ARS creates an individually-owned car displacement ratio of 8-10 to 1, meaning that the purchase of new vehicles will be considerably reduced at some time in the future.

As I said, there have been some profound changes in ARS strategy. Initially, partnerships appeared to be the way to enter the ARS market, with each company providing different elements needed to be successful. However, behind the scenes, there was a battle over who would control the customer and get to decide how to allocate the customer's ARS dollar. Now, it appears likely that the partnership strategy is not going to prevail in most cases. So, each company is going on its own to control its own destiny.

Two recent announcements by GM and Ford provide some insight into changes in their strategies. Let’s look at their ARS strategies first, and then let’s look at the ARS market more broadly. The timelines in these strategies and the magnitude of investment illustrate how rapidly this market is expected to emerge.

GM’s ARS Strategy

Autonomous Vehicle (AV) strategies have been evolving rapidly over the last few years, and GM is no exception. GM bought Cruise Automation in 2016 for approximately $580 million with other investments bringing it to $1 billion. Cruise Automation was started only two years earlier.

In January 2016, GM also made a $500 million investment in Lyft (NASDAQ:LYFT). At the time, there were rumors that GM made an offer to acquire Lyft but was turned down. GM said at the time that it would work with Lyft to develop autonomous ride services. However, these intentions didn’t materialize because of differences, most likely that each wanted to control the customer and get the most significant share of the ARS revenue from each ride. GM president Dan Ammann joined the board of Lyft shortly after the investment was made, but he subsequently resigned from the board. In June 2018, GM stated that it had no active projects with Lyft. It currently appears that GM will develop its own autonomous ride services service to compete with Lyft.

Recently (in May), GM spun off Cruise Holdings LLC with Japan’s SoftBank (OTCPK:SFTBF) investing $2.25 billion for a 19.6% stake in the new company. GM will also invest another $1.1 billion. SoftBank’s initial investment will be $900 million with an additional $1.35 billion when the AVs are ready for commercial deployment. Cruise is expected to become GM’s business for autonomous ride services. The timing of these investments into the company is consistent with the significant capital needs to enter the ARS business.

Note, selling less than 20% ownership has significant financial reporting consolidation and taxable income treatment for GM.

GM is quietly developing its own ridesharing app, called Cruise Anywhere, that its riders will use to request a ride from its ARS vehicles. It is also developing an ARS dispatch platform to be used to manage a fleet of AVs in each metropolitan area. The ARS dispatch platform will be necessary to control dispatching AVs to pick up passengers and then direct the vehicles to the next location. It will also monitor the status of each AV, respond to passenger requests, and even take control of the AV if needed.

GM Cruise is currently in its fourth iteration of AV. The AVs are based on the Chevrolet Bolt, but with significant AV renovations, and they are now referred to as Cruise AVs. GM acquired Strobe Inc., a three-year-old start-up, in October 2017 and is now using its technology to develop next-generation lidar technology for its AVs.

GM is currently testing a fleet of about 180 AVs in San Francisco, primarily with employees as passengers. Reportedly, GM has also installed 18 fast chargers in a garage in the Embarcadero waterfront.

Cruise is expected to launch its ARS as Cruise Anywhere sometime next year as a pilot. Initially, its ARS service will have very limited revenue, but my forecasted timing for the ARS market is that it will start to ramp up fast in two to three years. GM hasn’t disclosed the location for its initial ARS, but considering that it is testing and developing detailed maps in San Francisco, that will most likely be the location.

Ford’s ARS Strategy

Ford believes that the advent of autonomous vehicles will have a huge impact on everyday lives due to the centrality of transportation to both society and business, and that it is evolving quickly in both form and magnitude. Like GM's AV strategy, Ford's has also evolved quickly in form and magnitude. Initially, the company aggressively pursued external investments and acquisition opportunities in the latter half of 2016, backing or acquiring companies working in AI, lidar, and mapping. Its biggest autonomous technology investment came in February 2017, when it announced that it was investing $1B over the course of 5 years in AI startup Argo, and gaining majority ownership of the company. Ford then established its autonomous vehicle efforts around Argo.

Lidar is a critical technology that auto manufacturers lack, and in 2017, Ford acquired Princeton Lightwave to develop affordable lidar sensors. Previously, Ford invested $75 million in Velodyne.

Ford refocused its strategy on developing AVs for autonomous ride service vehicles first and then selling them later in retail markets. At the end of September 2017, Ford and Lyft announced a major joint initiative. The intent was that both companies would develop software that will allow Ford’s vehicles to operate with the Lyft mobile app. Lyft announced that Ford agreed to place its AVs on Lyft’s open platform, which enables partners to access its one million riders per day. Ford could use this opportunity to refine its ability to connect smoothly with a ride-hailing dispatch platform. This may be indicative that Ford could supply AVs to Lyft, or that it will provide the ARS vehicles and use Lyft as a service, but it is by no means certain since Lyft has other partnerships.

Then recently, on July 24th, Ford Motor Company made a significant strategic move, creating Ford Autonomous Vehicles LLC (AVLLC), indicating that Ford would use this new entity to launch its own ARS. Its intent is that the new business will be able to develop the right business and business model with less concern about Ford's legacy business. The new organization is charged with accelerating its AV business to capitalize on market opportunities. Ford Autonomous Vehicles LLC will include Ford’s self-driving systems integration, autonomous vehicle research and advanced engineering, AV transportation-as-a-service network development, user experience, business strategy and business development teams. Similar to GM Cruise, the new LLC is structured to take on third-party investment and will hold Ford’s ownership stake in Argo AI. Ford expects to invest $4 billion in its AV efforts through 2023, including its $1 billion investment in Argo AI.

The consolidation of all AV activities into a new business entity with a charter for developing a transportation-as-a-service network and with the expectation for outside investment clearly indicates that Ford will enter the ARS market using Ford Autonomous Vehicles LLC. While Ford may still do some partnership arrangement with Lyft, this is a clear indication that it intends to enter the ARS market on its own.

Ford is taking an interesting strategy in developing a new autonomous ride services vehicle. First-generation ARS vehicles are versions of production vehicles that are retrofit with autonomous capabilities. For example, the Cruise AV just mentioned is an adaptation of the Chevrolet Bolt, and Waymo (NASDAQ:GOOG) (NASDAQ:GOOGL) is retrofitting the Fiat Chrysler (NYSE:FCAU) Pacifica Hybrid minivan and Jaguar I-Pace. In contrast, Ford is developing an entirely new AV from the ground up, instead of retrofitting an existing model. This will most likely delay Ford's entry into the ARS market, but probably not too late. In addition to being a vehicle designed specifically for ARS, and possibly what will become a "second-generation" vehicle instead of a retrofit first generation, it will be a hybrid, where most experts expect second-generation ARS vehicles to be electric. Ford's reason for a hybrid is quite compelling: it wants to make this vehicle more profitable for ARS providers. A hybrid can drive much longer without refueling than electric AVs, and this can be very important to ARS providers where utilization is critical. Having a major portion of its fleet down for an hour of recharging during peak periods could become a big problem. This design consideration illustrates that Ford is serious about the ARS market as its initial AV opportunity.

Ford intends to launch its AVs, most likely as autonomous ride services, in 2021. This is a little later than others, but not too late because it's when I forecast the rapid ramp-up of the ARS market. Ford is already testing AVs in Miami, as well as in other areas. Ford is also developing a strategy around autonomous delivery, which could provide another source of revenue.

The Autonomous Ride Services Market Opportunity

In my recent Seeking Alpha articles: Google Tips Its Hand on Its Autonomous Vehicle Strategy, And It Will Be Big and Deciphering Apple's Autonomous Vehicle Strategy, I described my thoughts on the emerging market for autonomous ride services. I won’t repeat all the details of my market estimates; instead, I will summarize some of the highlights.

ARS is ridesharing without a driver. The economic advantages of eliminating the cost of a driver and achieving much higher utilization of ARS vehicles will reduce the cost of transportation significantly. I estimate that the price of a typical ARS trip will be less than half of a typical Uber (NYSE:UBER) trip today, and it might be even much lower than that. Even at this much lower price, ARS will be very profitable compared to the typical loses in ridesharing. ARS will be even more convenient than ride-sharing, and ARS vehicles will provide a more comfortable interior.

ARS will be the first market for autonomous vehicles (AVs). People will be more comfortable trying out a trip in an autonomous vehicle than taking the risk of purchasing one. ARS will be initially provided in selected municipal areas, most likely in the South and areas with favorable weather conditions. ARS vehicles only need to be sufficiently autonomous, by which I mean that they just need to be able to travel on specific routes, not every back road or alley. Geo-fencing will define the suitable roads for ARS vehicles.

I expect that ARS will be fleet-based. For example, 500-1,000 ARS vehicles will be placed into a typical municipal area by an ARS company (such as GM, Waymo, or Uber) with potentially 2-3 ARS companies eventually competing in each primary market. Because they are fleet-based, the ARS vehicles can be more easily serviced, maintained, and cleaned. An ARS will use specifically defined routes within each metropolitan area that its vehicles can maneuver with proven reliability. When a passenger requests a ride from one location to another, the ARS app will validate that it is a route it can manage, and if not, then it will not offer that ride.

ARS will be such a potentially large and profitable market that I expect several large companies will enter this market aggressively. The nature of this market will also motivate competitors to open new municipal markets quickly. I compare it to a land rush. If Waymo and Uber each put 1,000 vehicle fleets into a specific municipal market, then GM may bypass this market and go into another. Once ARS is accepted as a viable and attractive service, then aggressive competition will drive rapid growth.

I estimate the size of the ARS market in the United States to be approximately $150 billion by 2025. I get there with my assumptions that each ARS vehicle will make 50 trips per day, which is the same assumption that Waymo subsequently made, and that each trip will average $8.75 with vehicle utilization of 350 days per year. This equates to approximately $150,000 of revenue per vehicle annually. With 1 million ARS vehicles operational by the end of 2025, total ARS revenue in the U.S. would be $150 billion; however, it would still only account for approximately 3% to 3.5% of total miles traveled. This estimated ARS revenue of $150 billion by 2025 may be understated since Waymo has already stated plans for more than 80,000 ARS vehicles by 2021, which almost all of the 100,000 ARS vehicles I predict for 2021.

Expected Structure of the ARS Industry

In order to anticipate what is required to compete successfully in the ARS market, you first need to understand the expected structure of this new industry. Like any other industry, the ARS industry is best viewed as the “layers” required to provide ARS services. Different competitors will compete in different groups of layers. Here is my view of these layers from top to bottom:

  • Ride-Hailing App – ARS starts with the ability for a passenger to request an autonomous ride, similar to the way it works with Uber and Lyft.

  • AV Dispatch and Management System – This is the software system that dispatches vehicles to riders, controls travel between rides, manages ride billing, communicates with passengers as needed, and possibly takes control of the AV if necessary.

  • Municipal Fleet Operations Management – Encompasses the management of the physical fleet – including maintenance, cleaning, software updates, local variations – in each municipal fleet.

  • Fleet Ownership – The investment ARS fleets will require very significant financial resources so third-party investors could own fleets.

  • Autonomous Vehicle Technology – This consists of the platform of sensors, computing processing, and software that runs the vehicle autonomously.

  • “Dumb” vehicle – Not intended as a criticism, but some competitors in this market will purchase a high volume of customized vehicles without any intelligence to fit their AV technology.

Within these layers, I expect various ARS companies to compete differently, depending on the strengths and experience they bring to this new industry. The ride-hailing app will be the primary point in the ARS system controlling the customer. Whoever “owns” the most popular ARS apps will control the customer and will probably take a larger share of the profit because of this. The autonomous vehicle technology is what I refer to as the “defining technology” of the ARS platform. It is what truly enables an ARS vehicle and will be most critical to success.

Expected ARS Competitors

The ARS market doesn’t exist yet, but it is close enough in time (only a year or two away now) to identify the most likely competitors to enter the market. As I wrote in my previous SA article, I see Waymo with a lead over others in the market, as it will enter the market early and aggressively, but there will be other strong competitors in the United States as well.

Large technology companies will be attracted to this enormous market opportunity, and they bring critical software technology and computer experience to it. In addition to Waymo, as I discussed in my SA article on Deciphering Apple's Autonomous Vehicle Strategy, I also see Apple (AAPL) coming into this market, even though it hasn’t declared its intentions yet. In addition to the technical expertise to develop AV technologies, these two companies have two other advantages. They have the smartphone platform to introduce an ARS app rapidly. They also have the deep financial resources needed to invest the billions of dollars required for ARS fleets. I don’t expect them to build the basic vehicles. Instead, they will initially modify current production vehicles with their own autonomous vehicle technology. Then later, they will design their own ARS vehicles and subcontract the manufacturing.

The current ridesharing companies, particularly Uber and Lyft, must compete in the ARS market, as it will cannibalize their entire business eventually. They can use their dominant position with an existing customer base and prominent ridesharing apps to enter the ARS market. They will also be able to provide a mixture of ride services. In the Uber app, for example, a passenger could choose between UberX, UberXL, or UberAV, and the app would identify if UberAV is available for that route and provide the lower price for it. However, the ridesharing companies lack the remaining layers necessary for ARS, especially the AV technology, basic vehicle manufacturing, and the capital necessary to create AV fleets. Uber has been developing its own AV technology, but it has had some well-publicized setbacks recently. Lyft does not appear to have invested substantially enough in developing its own AV technology and will probably depend on others. This makes Lyft a very attractive acquisition candidate to others entering the ARS market.

Outside of a group of interesting start-ups, car manufacturers are the other potential competitors. GM and Ford will be the primary initial competitors in the United States, but I expect other car manufacturers will also enter the market. Mercedes, for example, is currently in a process of spinning off its potential ARS business as a subsidiary similar to GM and Ford. These car manufacturers come to the market with skills in vehicle design and manufacturing. GM and Ford are aggressively developing their own AV technology. They will be new to the top layers of the ARS platform, especially the ride-hailing app, but they appear to be developing their own. It still needs to be determined if that will grab sufficient customer attention. They also lack the capital required to create ARS fleets. That is what makes the spin-off of the potential ARS business so interesting. They are planning in advance to have a separate entity that can raise the capital needed.

ARS Market Share

While the size of the ARS market can be anticipated and even roughly projected, it is still too early to predict who will garner the largest shares of this market. It's important to note that the ARS market has an important distinction: it will be a local-services market, unlike smartphones and search engines that are global markets. So, competition will be by region or by municipal area, and competitors will initially be more disbursed.

For example, Waymo may be the first to provide ARS in the Scottsdale Arizona area, and possibly others. But GM may be the first to enter the San Francisco market, and Ford might be the first to enter the Miami market. ARS customers in San Francisco will only be able to use GM Cruise initially since there won't be any other ARS available. The primary (largest) and secondary ARS markets won't be fully populated with competitors until the later part of the 2020s. So, the ARS market will be disbursed to some extent until it finally consolidates.

Based on my research, I currently see 3-5 major competitors gaining approximately two-thirds of the U.S. market by 2025 with another 5-10 competitors sharing the remainder. Based on my estimates of a $150 billion U.S. market in 2025 and a $750 billion in 2030, this is a significant revenue opportunity for these 3-5 companies to achieve $15-30 billion in revenue in 2025 and $100-200 billion by 2030 in the United States ARS market alone.

Based on what appears to be more aggressive ARS strategies backed by billions in investment, GM and Ford will be in the mix as significant competitors for the ARS market, along with Waymo, Apple, Uber, and Lyft. Although AV investment data is not available for Uber and Lyft, it is very possible that GM and Ford are investing much more than either of these two companies. Whether they will be in the top five or in the second tier depends on how well they execute their strategies, but they certainly have a good chance.

Impact on Valuation

Looking at GM and Ford, what is the potential impact on their valuations from entering the ARS market?

The starting point for future valuations, however, is not simply measuring an increase in their current valuations because ARS will significantly cannibalize the retail car manufacturing business. While I have modeled this out in some of my research, the model is too complex for this article and unnecessary to make the point. In simple terms, as ARS becomes more popular, car ownership will decline. This impact is already being seen with ridesharing services. Even though ridesharing drivers still purchase their vehicles at retail, they do have higher utilization than individual owners. The average individually-owned car is utilized only 5% of the time and sits idle the rest of the time. Ridesharing vehicles are utilized more, which is why ridesharing is already impacting car sales volumes. ARS will have a much more dramatic impact on retail car sales. ARS utilization will be 50-60%, meaning that approximately one ARS vehicle will eventually displace 8-10 or more individually-owned vehicles. Once more, these ARS vehicles will be fleet-based and not purchased at retail. It’s premature to forecast the full extent and timing of this impact and whether it will come first from new cars or used car sales, but it’s safe to say that the success of ARS will eventually reduce new car sales. GM and Ford know this, which is why they are heavily investing in ARS. It’s not just a new market opportunity; it’s a major transition of their fundamental business of providing transportation.

With this transition, I expect that GM’s and Ford’s ARS subsidiaries eventually will be worth more than their current car manufacturing businesses. Morgan Stanley analyst Brian Nowak said recently that Alphabet's Waymo may be worth $175 billion instead of his prior estimate of $75 billion, and much of this comes from autonomous ride services.

GM’s market cap is currently about $53 billion, including its share of its Cruise subsidiary that was valued at $9 billion with SoftBank’s investment of $2.25 billion for less than 20% ownership. This then assumes that the basic car manufacturing business is worth approximately $44 billion. The ARS business is expected to be very profitable, and it will have extremely high growth rates for many years. This will most likely provide very favorable valuations for ARS businesses. For example, if GM is successful in the ARS market (and that's still a big IF), then Cruise could increase in value from $9 billion (GM’s 80% share) to potentially something as large as $40 billion to as much as $80 billion (assuming $10-$20 billion in ARS revenue, a 20% profit margin, a growth-based PE of 25X, and continued 80% ownership share). This would more than offset the decline in the valuation of its current car manufacturing business. If GM, is not successful in the ARS business, then it might be reduced to a subcontract manufacturer for other ARS companies, and its future valuation could be significantly reduced from today.

The story is similar for Ford. It has a current market cap of approximately $40 billion. Since there is no outside investment yet in its Ford Autonomous Vehicle LLC subsidiary, there is no way to value it. Success in the ARS business could more than double its market value by the mid-2020s. Failure could significantly decrease its current market value.

In summary, autonomous ride services is not just a potential opportunity for GM and Ford, it’s a fundamental strategic transition of the way transportation is provided, and it will determine their future values. It’s Digital Equipment, Polaroid, IBM, and Xerox all over again – but only much bigger. And both of these companies know this, which is why they are betting their future on AVs in general and ARS in particular. They don’t intend to stand by and just watch it happen.

If you are a current investor in GM or Ford, you need to be aware that you may own an ARS business in the future. If you want to invest in a future ARS business, then GM and Ford may be a way to get there. But all of this depends on how successful they can be in executing this strategic transition.

Deciphering Apple's Autonomous Vehicle Strategy

Deciphering Apple's Autonomous Vehicle Strategy

Michael E. McGrath

Originally published in Seeking Alpha on Jun. 13, 2018 

Summary

  • For years there have been rumors about Apple's autonomous vehicle (AV) strategy, many leading to mistaken conclusions.

  • Apple recently received permits from California to increase its test AVs from 3 to 62, clearly showing it is serious about AVs.

  • Apple also recently agreed to customize Volkswagen T-6 vans into autonomous shuttles.

  • I believe that Apple will enter the market for autonomous ride services (ARS), although there are pros and cons to its success.

  • If successful (and there is still a lot to be proven), this could provide Apple with a significant new source of revenue.

In April 2017, Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL) was granted a permit from the California DMV to test three AVs on public roads, using Lexus RX450h SUVs. It just recently increased this to 62 authorized AVs in California, along with 83 permitted AV drivers. Apple now has the second largest AV test fleet in California behind GM Cruise with 104, although other companies such as Waymo are testing more vehicles in other states.

Recently, Apple was reported to be developing and preparing to test an autonomous shuttle van with its employees later in 2018 or 2019. It has a deal with Volkswagen (VLKAY) to customize its new T6 Transporter vans for these autonomous shuttles.

Over the last 18 months, I have researched autonomous vehicles, the technologies that enable them, the opportunities they will create, and the strategies expected competitors would follow. My earlier Seeking Alpha article - Google Tips Its Hand on Its Autonomous Vehicle Strategy, And It Will Be Big - introduced Waymo's (GOOG) (NASDAQ:GOOGL) AV strategy and the significant opportunity for autonomous ride services. Now in this article, I will try to decipher Apple's AV strategy and its opportunity.

My focus here is long term and strategic. It involves my expectations of the AV markets and Apple's strategy. It is not based on any insider information, but rather on my deep experience in the strategies of technology companies. It may be of interest to long-term investors in Apple who are wondering if there are any new significant revenue drivers on the horizon in the next 2-4 years.

Fragmented History of Apple’s AV Strategy

Apple keeps its product development strategies a secret, so one can only piece together leaks and rumors to describe its fragmented history, but even this provides some valuable insight. Apple reportedly began working aggressively on what it called project Titan by 2014, with what was rumored to be a large team of 1,000 or more. A couple of years later, Apple refocused project Titan away from designing and building its own complete autonomous vehicle, laying off several hundred people in the process.

Reports at the time claimed that Apple scuttled plans to build a self-driving car of its own, after a haphazard effort fell into disarray, to focus on the underlying technology. Frankly jumping to this type of conclusion fails to recognize how strategies for new markets evolve. Apple's refocused strategy made a lot of sense because at that point in time, insights were beginning to suggest that autonomous ride services (ARS), not retail sales of AVs, would be the most significant opportunity for a newcomer in the market.

In conjunction with this conclusion, there was also a recognition that the first generation of ARS vehicles would most likely be retrofitted versions of production cars. Waymo probably made a similar strategic shift around the same time.

In June of 2017, Apple CEO Tim Cook spoke publicly about Apple's work on autonomous driving software, confirming the company's work. "We're focusing on autonomous systems. It's a core technology that we view as very important. We sort of see it (referring to autonomous vehicles) as the mother of all AI projects. It's probably one of the most difficult AI projects actually to work on." “There is a major disruption looming there,” Cook later said on Bloomberg Television, citing self-driving technology, electric vehicles, and ride-hailing. "You've got kind of three vectors of change generally happening in the same time frame."

In the interview, Cook was hesitant to disclose whether Apple will ultimately manufacture its car. "We'll see where it takes us," Cook said. "We're not saying from a product point of view what we will do." The reference to ride-hailing indicated Apple's interest in autonomous ride services and the flexibility in manufacturing indicates keeping options open over the long term.

Toward the end of 2017, there were rumors that Apple was leasing a former Fiat Chrysler-owned proving grounds in Arizona to test autonomous vehicles. Also, there were indications that Apple was recruiting automotive test engineers and technicians from other proving grounds for that location. The property was leased to a company named Route 14 Investment Partners LLC. with no other identification or link to ownership.

Recent stories, particularly one published by the New York Times on May 23, criticized Apple for what they saw as a failure of Apple's autonomous vehicle strategy. The New York Times article was mistaken stating that: “Apple once had grand aspirations to build its own electric self-driving car and lead the next generation of transportation. Over time, the tech giant’s ambitions ran into reality. So, Apple curtailed its original vision, first by focusing on software for self-driving cars and then by working solely on an autonomous shuttle for its own use with employees. Now, the tech giant has settled for an auto partner that was not its first choice.”

A better understanding of autonomous vehicles and the new markets they will create provides a very different interpretation of Apple's AV strategy. Apple, like Google and other innovative companies, started looking at autonomous vehicle technologies and opportunities many years ago. Like most new technologies, as the technologies develop then the best ways to bring these technologies to market also change.

Apple’s Investment in Autonomous Vehicles

Apple does not disclose its R&D investment by product area, but based on rumors and some indicators, it appears to be investing significantly in autonomous vehicles and may have stepped up that investment recently. Apple has not disclosed when it started investing in AV development, but Apple was rumored in 2014 to have as many as 1,000 people working on project Titan, and then reduced that number by several hundred. So, its AV development project started well before 2014.

Over the last couple of years, Apple has been aggressively recruiting autonomous vehicle engineers and drivers. The typical total fully-loaded cost for an engineer is approximately $200,000 per year, so 750 engineers cost roughly $150 million annually. Other expenses such as labs, equipment, sensors development and testing, pilot test vehicles, and potentially a test track, can quickly add up to $50 million or more.

This would put Apple at investing close to $200 million annually in autonomous vehicles, which is approximately $1 billion over the last five years. Testing autonomous vehicles can get very expensive with the capital investment in the retrofitted vehicles and drivers. With two more years of pilot testing, Apple could potentially invest cumulatively as much as $2 billion developing autonomous vehicles by the time I expect the market to emerge in 2021. And it could be investing much more if it is designing a specialized computing platform for AVs.

Another data point on this potential investment is the acceleration of Apple's investment in R&D. Its R&D investment has jumped significantly from $4.5 billion (3% of revenue) in 2013 to $11.6 billion (5% of revenue) in 2017. While this by no means is meant to imply that most of the increase in R&D investment is all in autonomous vehicle R&D, it does suggest that Apple is investing in much more in R&D than the sustaining engineering of its existing products such as the iPhone, and there is plenty of room for a $200 million or even greater annual AV investment in the $7 billion increase.

This investment does not include Apple’s $1 billion investment in May 2016 in Chinese ride-hailing service Didi Chuxing, which dominates the ridesharing market in China. Apple later received a seat on the Didi Chuxing board of directors. The ultimate benefit of this strategic investment is still to be seen, but it may provide Apple with some options of partnering in the Chinese ARS market.

I believe that Apple intends to compete in autonomous vehicles (AVs). The various AV markets will be enormous, more than $1 trillion in the US alone by 2030. As one of the largest high-technology companies in the world, Apple cannot afford to sit on the sidelines and let others succeed. AVs are probably one of few, maybe the only, new market in the next decade that will enable a company of Apple's size to grow significantly.

The real question then is what AV strategy we can expect from Apple.

What Apple’s AV Strategy Is NOT

In deciphering Apple’s potential AV strategy, we can first start by looking at what its strategy is NOT. Apple will NOT design, manufacture, and sell cars by retail to the public. This market is just too difficult, risky, competitive, and expected to shrink. Apple will NOT acquire Tesla (TSLA) – sorry to disappoint all those investors hoping for that. Tesla, Ford (F), GM (GM), BMW (OTCPK:BMWYY), Mercedes (OTCPK:DDAIF), and others will fight it out in this market. I also believe that the AV retail market will take much longer to emerge than other AV markets. Apple does not want to get involved in this market.

Apple will NOT simply license its AV technology. While it has invested billions in developing AV technology, so have others. It’s unlikely that these others will simply abandon their AV investments and license Apple’s. Plus, it is not a very lucrative opportunity. Even if Apple could license its software for $2,000 per vehicle (not likely), and could license this to 500,000 to a million cars per year (which would be a high estimate), this is only potential revenue of $1 to $2 billion revenue, at best.

The entertainment capabilities inside the vehicle will be important, but the opportunity for Apple to license this to auto manufacturers is also a relatively small opportunity. Most of the ARS companies and AV retail car manufacturers will want to control their own in-vehicle entertainment and get the revenue stream from this.

What Apple’s AV Strategy Probably Is

The most attractive new AV market for Apple is autonomous ride services (ARS). It is a brand-new market with no entrenched competition. It will be the first significant new market for autonomous vehicles because the vehicles simply need to be sufficiently autonomous to succeed. Technology companies such as Google and Apple have some critical advantages entering this market.

It is a new market, so there are not any well-entrenched competitors, other than Uber (UBER) and Lyft (LYFT) which are providing similar, but much more expensive, ridesharing services. A new market enables the early entrants to define the market to some extent and not have to compete on the terms of incumbent competitors. The ARS market doesn’t require the supply chain and retail channels of distribution that create barriers to entry into the retail AV sales.

The ARS market will require an autonomous vehicle platform of technologies – specifically the sensors, computing power and most importantly the software for autonomous driving. Technology companies have a significant advantage in creating this platform. The vehicle itself is also part of the platform, but this part is a "dumb" vehicle that can be a commodity or eventually custom-designed vehicle specifically for ARS.

Rides in the ARS market will be requested using an app on iPhones or other smartphones. Apple and Google control the operating systems for smartphones and can add their ARS apps directly to the smartphone with an operating system update. Also, Apple can automatically link its new ARS app to almost a billion Apple Pay and iTunes accounts.

The Autonomous Ride Services (ARS) Market Opportunity

In my recent Seeking Alpha article - Google Tips Its Hand on Its Autonomous Vehicle Strategy, And It Will Be Big - I described my thoughts on the emerging market for autonomous ride services (ARS). There were many questions about the potential size of this market, so I will try to provide more detail here.

ARS is ridesharing without a driver. The economic advantages of eliminating the cost of a driver and achieving high utilization of ARS vehicles will reduce the cost significantly. I estimate that the price of a typical ARS trip will be less than half of a typical Uber trip today, and it might be even much lower than that. Even at this much lower price, ARS will be very profitable compared to the regular loses in ridesharing. ARS will be even more convenient than ridesharing because rides can be scheduled in advance, and ARS vehicles will provide a more comfortable interior.

ARS will be the first market for autonomous vehicles (AVs). People will be more comfortable trying out a trip on an autonomous vehicle than taking the risk of purchasing one. ARS will be initially provided in selected municipal areas, most likely in the South and areas with favorable weather conditions. ARS vehicles only need to be sufficiently autonomous, by which I mean that they just need to be able to travel on specific routes, not every back road or alley. Geo-fencing will define the suitable roads for ARS vehicles.

I expect that ARS will be fleet-based. So initially, 500-1,000 ARS vehicles will be placed into a typical municipal area by an ARS company with potentially 2-3 ARS companies competing in each market. Because they are fleet-based, the ARS vehicles can be more easily serviced, maintained, and cleaned. An ARS will use specifically defined routes within each metropolitan area that its vehicles can maneuver those routes with proven reliability. When a passenger requests a ride from one location to another, the ARS app will validate that it is a route it can manage, and if not, then it will not offer that ride.

For many people, ARS will reduce the cost of transportation. AAA estimates that it costs approximately $8,500 to own a car, not including the cost of fuel. With the cost of fuel, this translates to about $850 per month for a car, not including the cost of parking, which is considerable in many cities. Many people will find it less expensive to use ARS for their travel needs, especially families who may own two cars. There have already been studies that using Uber is less costly than owning a car in several American cities. With a much lower cost per trip, the number of cities where ARS is less expensive than owning a car will increase significantly.

If this happens, then car ownership and new car sales will decline, but this is a topic for a later article.

ARS at its lower cost may also start to displace public transportation. If you look at a range of examples, the cost of an ARS trip could be comparable to public transportation, and it eliminates the need to walk to and from the bus or train stop by going directly from where you are to where you want to be. I also expect that some businesses, particularly restaurants, will offer complimentary rides to their customers. In many cases, it will be less expensive than valet parking and will attract more customers and potentially increased alcohol sales.

ARS will be such a potentially large and profitable market that I expect that several large companies, including Apple, will enter this market aggressively. The nature of this market will also motivate competitors to open new municipal markets quickly. I compare it to a land rush. If Waymo and Uber each put 1,000 vehicle fleets into a specific municipal market, then Apple may bypass this market and go into another. Once ARS is accepted as a viable and attractive service, aggressive competition will drive rapid growth.

I estimate the size of the ARS market in the United States to be approximately $150 billion by 2025. I get there with my assumptions that each ARS vehicle will make 50 trips per day, which is the same assumption that Waymo subsequently made, and that each trip will average $8.75 with vehicle utilization of 350 days per year. This equates to approximately $150,000 of revenue per vehicle annually. With 1 million ARS vehicles operational by the end of 2025, total ARS revenue in the US would be $150 billion. It would still only account for approximately 3% to 3.5% of total miles traveled.

Another way of looking at this is through the projected growth of ridesharing. The number or ridesharing rides in the United States last year, based on reports for Uber and Lyft, was approximately 2.5 billion. Ridesharing grew at a fantastic pace, averaging more than 75% from 2016. Depending on continued growth assumptions, the ridesharing market in the US by 2025 could range from 43 billion trips (at 50% growth) to 80 billion trips (at 70% growth). My assumptions for the ARS market would equate to 17.5 billion ARS trips in 2025. This would be reasonable cannibalization of the ridesharing market even at the 50% growth rate, and this doesn't include market expansion due to lower-priced trips and increased convenience.

Why Apple's Previous Negotiations Were Not A Failure

The key to success in the ARS market, as it is in many technology markets, is a platform strategy where you provide or control the critical aspects of the product or offering platform. In the ARS market, ride request and dispatch sit at the top of the offering platform. Whoever controls this, can provide or subcontract the actual autonomous vehicles.

The critical value-added, or what I refer to as the defining technology, in the AV platform is the autonomous driving capabilities, specifically the sensor package, computer processing, and the extensive software to direct the vehicle. Except for unique interior designs, the actual “dumb vehicle” is less important and can be replaced over time. It essentially becomes a fleet purchase or contract manufacturing.

Companies who want to compete in this market realize the importance of this platform strategy, and they don’t want to be put in a subordinated position. They want to control the platform. The New York Times characterization of previous Apple negotiations with BMW and Mercedes as a failure misses the strategic issues.

These companies don't want to be put into a subordinated position to Apple with Apple controlling the customer, in this case, the ARS passenger. In fact, they intend to compete with Apple. Apple wants to control the critical aspects of the ARS platform. So, one company needs to give into the long-term success of the other, and neither company wanted to do that.

Why the VW T-6 Transporter Makes Sense for Apple

The Volkswagen T-6 Transporter is an interesting strategic choice for Apple. It is a very popular vehicle in Europe, although not sold in the United States. It is also highly configurable with different seating arrangements, but it is also easily customized to individual preferences. 

According to the New York Times article, Apple and Volkswagen plan to remake the T-6 into a custom autonomous vehicle, potentially even converting it into an electric vehicle. The basics of the T-6 will remain - but seating, the interior, and even the dashboard may change. This is in addition to adding the sensors and computers required for autonomous driving.

Apple will initially use the vehicle as a pilot to shuttle employees between its two main campuses with a backup driver and technician tracking the vehicle’s performance. Once this autonomous vehicle is proven, Apple could include a customized version of this autonomous vehicle into its autonomous ride services fleet in addition to the Lexus RX450h SUVs or other autonomous vehicles.

It is also possible that Apple could provide this shuttle for autonomous shuttle services in some partnership form. I think autonomous shuttles also will be an early AV market because they only need to be sufficiently autonomous to go from one predetermined location to another along the same routes all the time.

The Timing For ARS Market

I expect that the ARS market will be created in stages. We are currently in what I refer to as Stage 0 (2016-2020), Development and Testing, and this stage will continue until 2020. During this stage, we will increasingly see more ARS pilot programs, using autonomous vehicles without drivers.

Waymo has indicated that it plans to test ARS without a driver starting later this year. GM Cruise intends to test ARS in 2019. Apple's intention of testing its shuttle service in either this year or early next year, as well as its rapidly increasing number of ARS vehicles being tested in California, are consistent with being competitive in this Development and Testing Stage.

I see Stage 1, the Launch of ARS in the U.S., as starting in 2021. This is the big transition point when ARS will become an accepted form of transportation in many municipal areas. By the end of 2021, I estimate that 100,000 ARS vehicles will be in service, generating approximately $15 billion in revenue.

This estimate may prove to be low since Waymo has already indicated it will be testing 20,000 I-Pace SUVs and 62,000 Chrysler Pacifica Hybrid minivans by 2020. From 2021, I expect that the number of ARS vehicles will double or more annually, reaching 1 million vehicles and a $750 billion market by 2025. At this point, it will still only represent about 3% to 3.5% of the total miles traveled in the United States.

During Stage 1 (2021-2025), I expect that most of the ARS vehicles will be customized versions of car models currently in volume production by car manufacturers. The level of customization may vary. Many will still have steering wheels, while some may have significantly customized interiors designed for passenger comfort.

These customized vehicles will mostly be "dumb cars" without any ADAS functionality that are purchased in volume with the autonomous driving capabilities retrofitted by the technology company onto the vehicle. In particular, I don't expect Waymo, Apple, Uber, and Lyft to get into car manufacturing. The auto companies entering the ARS market may have somewhat different strategies.

During Stage 2 (2026-2030), what I refer to as Broad AV Acceptance and Disruption, the ARS market will accelerate. This is also the Stage where I expect fully-automated vehicles to be sold in volume to retail customers. Focusing on the ARS market in Stage 2, most ARS vehicles will be custom designed. They will look more like living rooms or offices than cars. The technology inside for passengers will be impressive. The ARS companies will begin to design these custom vehicles during Stage 1 and contract with manufacturers, either auto companies or contract manufacturers like Magna (MGA), to build them in volume.

I estimate that the ARS market will reach 5 million vehicles by 2030 and generate approximately $750 billion in revenue in the United States, but it will still only capture about 15% of the total miles driven. Globally, ARS will be a huge market with more than $1.5 trillion in revenue in 2030, causing enormous disruptions to other industries.

Can Apple Be Successful In The ARS Market?

While I have confidence in the size of the ARS market and confidence that Apple will enter this market, it is premature to allocate market share and determine the winners and losers in this market.

Waymo has some early-mover advantages that could translate into early market share advantage. As I mentioned, Waymo expects to begin testing its ARS this year and has commitments to buy as many as 80,000 AVs over the next few years. I don't see the ARS market emerging for another 2-3 years, so there is still time for all competitors. Also, I envision the ARS market to be deployed regionally by metropolitan area, and it will take 5-10 years to fully deploy throughout the US, giving time for later entrants to still capture meaningful market share.

There are also skeptics that see Apple's shortcomings in artificial intelligence as carrying over into the software that controls autonomous vehicles. Apple could fall so far behind Waymo that it might never be comfortable to enter the ARS market or be so far behind that it never captures meaningful market share.

There will be other competitors too in the ARS market. GM's recent move to carve out its Cruise business targeting ARS with SoftBank (OTCPK:SFTBY) investing $2.25 billion and GM investing $1.1 billion demonstrates its intention of being a serious ARS competitor. Uber has serious intentions in the ARS market, as it must because ARS will almost wholly cannibalize ridesharing, but it has been stumbling recently. I also expect Ford and Lyft to be serious competitors, and there are other possible competitors too.

The ARS market will be very large, and I expect intense competition. A meaningful market share of this $150 billion market by 2025 could provide a significant revenue for the companies that succeed. A 20% market share would generate $30 billion in revenue, and a 33% share could generate $50 billion in revenue. By 2030, even a 20% market share could translate into $150 billion in revenue.

As I mentioned in my previous article, this industry will be capital intensive. Google and Apple will have some advantages with their large cash balances.

Unlike most of its products, Apple will need to disclose its ARS strategy in advance of a product launch. This is because of regulatory approvals, local metropolitan area approvals, and the size of the vehicle investments. I expect that Apple will disclose its ARS strategy in the next 1-2 years, so it can be a viable competitor when the ARS market emerges in 2021. At that point, investment analysts will begin to build ARS revenue estimates into their projections. Prior to then, it will be necessary to decipher Apple's autonomous vehicle strategy to get a jump on that.

Is Lyft The Next Blockbuster or Blockbuster Video?

Is Lyft The Next Blockbuster or Blockbuster Video?

Michael E. McGrath

Originally published in Seeking Alpha on Mar. 21, 2019 


Summary

  • Eventually, Lyft's ridesharing business will be replaced  by autonomous ride services (ARS).

  • The economic and pricing advantages of ARS are far superior.

  • A capital and technology-intensive business model always replaces a labor-intensive model.

  • Investors in Lyft are ultimately investing in its long-term prospects in autonomous ride services.

  • Yet its ARS strategy has many open questions.

With Lyft's (NASDAQ:LYFT) IPO, there is increased attention on the rapidly growing ride-sharing business, even though it is unprofitable. The fundamental issue facing Lyft, as well as Uber (NYSE:UBER), is how will it compete against or use autonomous ride services. Will it become a blockbuster in this new industry or displaced by new technology, just as Blockbuster Video was?

Blockbuster Video was a hot stock to own in the 1990s with rapid growth, reaching almost $6 billion in revenue in 2003. Netflix (NASDAQ:NFLX) began competing using its mail-based subscription model and then introduced streaming video in 2007. Blockbuster could not compete with streaming video, and it filed for bankruptcy in 2010.

In my previous Seeking Alpha articles, I explained the advantages of autonomous ride services (essentially Uber or Lyft without a driver) over ridesharing. Here we will look at the implications on Lyft and its ARS strategy, but first, let's review an updated business model comparison that was introduced in a previous article - Uber Must Have Autonomous Ride Services.

Comparison of Business Models

A business model defines the fundamental way a business works in economic or financial terms. It is a basic element of strategy. A business model is not intended to be precise; it’s directionally correct. It’s not a financial projection, even though it frequently appears as one. It uses financial projections to illustrate directionally how the business works. Let’s compare the business models for ridesharing and autonomous ride services, modeling them on the income and costs for a typical trip.

AV Business Models.jpeg


The business model projected for ridesharing starts with data from Lyft and Uber and then projects some improvements. It uses revenue and cost for a 7-mile trip, which from many estimates is a typical Lyft or Uber trip. The price per-trip varies widely based on the time of the day, drive time, and distance. However, a 7-mile trip for $16.00 (approximately $2.30 per mile) is reasonably representative of a typical Lyft or Uber trip.

The driver cost uses the percentages from Lyft’s and Uber's recent revenue statements. For example, Lyft reported $8.1 billion in bookings with a $5.9 billion or 73.4% driver cost in its S-1. Of Uber’s $12 billion in quarterly billings, $9.2 billion (approximately 76%) went to its drivers and related expenses. The remainder of the ridesharing cost estimates comes directly from the percentages in their respective financial statements. They classify operating expenses somewhat differently, so the total operating expense is the best comparison. Using these ratios, both Lyft and Uber report losses on every trip, just as they do overall in their financial statements.

The ridesharing projected model averages the driver cost between the two services. It also assumes operating expense improvements with increased economies of scale. It also assumes a significant reduction in R&D costs since much of the current R&D is going toward developing autonomous vehicles. With these projections, ridesharing is approximately breakeven.

In the modeling for ARS, I use an average of $1.35 per mile, so that the 7-mile trip will be $9.45. This is approximately 40% less than a comparable ridesharing price for the same trip. ARS pricing will vary too. Initially, it may be closer to ridesharing pricing since it will be capacity constrained, but when ARS competitors have local fleets of 1,000 or more vehicles then prices will be reduced.

The overhead costs for the ARS model include similar operations costs and R&D (which would be about $3 billion per year allocated across all ARS vehicles). The end result in this model is an operating income estimate of 25%.

The ARS business model is significantly more profitable, even at a much lower price per trip. There are no driver related costs in the ARS model since there are no drivers. Instead, there are significant capital costs from investment in autonomous ride services vehicles. In my research, I estimate that a typical ARS vehicle will make 50 trips per day (Waymo uses the same estimate), for 350-days-per-year, with a 7-mile per trip average. Each vehicle will generate approximately $150,000 per year in revenue. I estimate the operating cost per vehicle at over $52,000 per year. This includes fuel, insurance, taxes, maintenance and cleaning ($20,000/year), and depreciation ($20,000/year). This would yield a 60% return on investment for a $100,000 ARS vehicle.

Readers of some of my previous articles were skeptical of the 50 trips per day assumption for autonomous ride services, so I also included a much lower 30 trip per day projection. This still shows a much more competitive and profitable model than ridesharing with an operating profit of 22% but a lower, although still viable, return on investment of 34%.

ARS could charge a higher price per trip and be even more profitable. Competition for ARS could force the price per trip even lower, but this lower price will most likely expand the market even faster and increase vehicle utilization. I modeled a lower cost-per-trip of $6, which is 65% less than the price of an Uber trip. At this price point, assuming somewhat higher demand and utilization, the ARS model is still profitable.

ARS Will Displace Ridesharing

The fundamental strategic difference in these business models is the well-proven examples throughout history; technology and capital-intensive business models displace labor-intensive business models. When this happens, the labor-intensive model loses every time.

At almost half the price per trip, ARS is much more profitable. Ridesharing is not yet profitable, and it cannot hope to be viable at these lower competitive prices. ARS will eventually displace ridesharing. One can argue about the timeframe for this. Is it going to start in two years or four years? Will ARS take 20% of the ridesharing market by 2025 or 50% of it? Regardless of timeframe, the conclusion is inevitable: ARS will eventually displace ridesharing.

ARS Competitors

Autonomous ride services will become a very large market. Ridesharing is currently a large market and growing rapidly. ARS will displace ridesharing over time and also accelerate the market because of much lower prices per trip.

ARS will be a geographic market, not a global market. It is a services market, not a product market. Approximately half-a-dozen major companies are expected to compete for that market in the U.S., rolling out their ARS services by metropolitan areas. Waymo, a subsidiary of Google (NASDAQ:GOOG) (NASDAQ:GOOGL), is the first to market. Cruise Automation (GM) is expected to follow in 2019. Ford Autonomous Vehicles LLC (F) is planning on launching its ARS services in 2021. ARS is crucial for Uber and Lyft because it will cannibalize their ridesharing business. They need to compete in this market or eventually face extinction, but they are both behind in developing autonomous vehicles. Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL), is the wildcard in the ARS market. It has yet to declare its intentions, but it is investing heavily in AV development and testing, and the ARS market is the only one that makes sense for it.

The advantage that Lyft and Uber may have in entering the ARS market is that they already have popular ridesharing apps. They can simply add an ARS service to their apps and riders can choose what they want. Others will need to get customers to use their apps to request a ride, but that may not be a substantial problem when ARS comes into a metropolitan area. The Uber and Lyft brands name may be an advantage, but it's hard to rely on a brand name as a differentiator.

Lyft’s Autonomous Rides Services Strategy

Lyft is investing in developing autonomous vehicles, but not as much as Uber, Waymo, Apple, Cruise Automation or Ford. Its strategy appears to rely on the technology development of others. Lyft's strategy is focused on building a network of partnerships. Lyft describes its two-pronged autonomous vehicle strategy in its S-1 as follows:

Pioneering Autonomous Vehicle Strategy. We are investing in autonomous technology and employ a two-pronged strategy to bring autonomous vehicles to market. Our Open Platform provides market-leading developers of autonomous vehicle technology access to our network to enable their vehicles to fulfill rides on our platform. Simultaneously, we are building our own world-class autonomous vehicle system at our Level 5 Engineering Center, with the goal of ensuring access to affordable and reliable autonomous technology. We believe that the strength of our brand, our trusted relationships with riders and our expertise in operating a ridesharing network at scale, as well as our two-pronged strategy to bring autonomous vehicles to market, will be competitive advantages that will enable us to capture value in the emerging autonomous vehicle ecosystem.


Lyft has several strategic partnerships that may offer access to autonomous vehicles. Its Open Platform partnership with Aptiv has enabled the commercial deployment of a small fleet of autonomous vehicles on its platform in Las Vegas.

The success of Lyft’s strategy of partnering with others providing the autonomous vehicles for ARS is risky. This strategy relies on partners that have invested billions in developing autonomous driving technology, giving Lyft control over riders and letting Lyft take a significant portion of the ARS rider fees. A few years ago, this seemed like a good strategy, and there were many partnerships, but then these companies realized that control of the autonomous ride services platform would dictate who made money. So, then they went off to develop their own ride services. Waymo decided to have its own platform, Waymo One. Then Ford and GM spun off their own ARS businesses.

It seems like this may not be evolving as Lyft intended. So, Lyft was forced to increase its own AV development investment. Lyft appears to acknowledge the inevitability of autonomous ride services and discloses the problem of not having an AV partner as a risk.

If we are unable to efficiently develop our own autonomous vehicle technologies or develop partnerships with other companies to offer autonomous vehicle technologies on our platform in a timely manner, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be adversely affected.

With its IPO, Lyft will have the financial resources to last for years even with continuing losses in ridesharing. It won't have sufficient financial resources to develop and launch autonomous ride services. It could possibly acquire a small company to accelerate its autonomous vehicle development, but it won't have the immense capital required to create autonomous fleets for ARS.

I previously saw Lyft as a potential acquisition candidate, but at the expected valuation, this is less likely. It will be a little bit like someone buying a mansion on the ocean and then tearing it down to build another house. It's not rational but could happen. It will be too expensive for GM and Ford to acquire Lyft. Google could acquire it to combine with Waymo, but may not need to do that. In any case, Lyft's voting structure will discourage potential acquirers.


Conclusion


So, the fundamental questions for investors in Lyft revolve around its strategy for autonomous ride services. Just like streaming video displaced video rental, ARS will replace ridesharing. Investing in Lyft should really be done as an investment in its longer-term strategy for autonomous ride services compared to its expected competitors.

If Uber Is Worth $100 Billion, What Is Waymo Worth

If Uber Is Worth $100 Billion, What Is Waymo Worth

Michael E. McGrath

Originally Published in Seeking Alpha  on Apr. 16, 2019 

Summary

  • Uber will not be very profitable, if at all, in the next few years. 

  • Autonomous ride services will have a significant cost advantage over ridesharing. 

  • Autonomous ride services will begin to displace ridesharing in 3-5 years. 

  • So, Uber should be evaluated based on its autonomous driving strategy. 

  • Waymo as the leader in autonomous ride services should be worth more than Uber. 

With Uber (UBER) set to go public at a valuation that may approach $100 billion, it is important for potential investors to understand why the current ridesharing model is unprofitable, and that it eventually will be displaced by a more profitable model. Autonomous ride services (NYSE:ARS) will eventually displace ridesharing. Uber's recent S-1 supports this statement. 

Investors in Uber either need to be comfortable that it can be profitable enough before ARS begins to displace ridesharing or be comfortable with Uber's strategy and competitive advantages for ARS. In this context, it's also useful to ask the question: If Uber is worth $100 billion, then how much is Waymo (GOOGL) worth?

Why is ARS a Lower Cost Model Than Ridesharing?

In my recent article on Lyft (Is Lyft The Next Blockbuster Or Blockbuster Video?), I presented a comparison of the business models for autonomous ride services (ARS) compared to ridesharing. I won't go through that model again in this article. Instead, I will just summarize it and add Uber's own statements about the advantages provided by autonomous driving.

The cost per mile of ridesharing is more than $2 per mile. In my previous model, I estimated that it was approximately $2.50 for Lyft and $2.40 for Uber. Using Uber's own aggregate financial information in its S-1 it is approximately $2.05 per mile worldwide, and most likely higher than that in the U.S. In 2018, it paid $38.5 billion to drivers and incurred another $14.3 billion in operating expenses, for a total cost to deliver its ridesharing services of $52.9 billion. It also estimated that its drivers drove 26 billion miles in that year. Uber paid its drivers 77.5% of its bookings. It's important to note that Uber's numbers are global (about 40% outside of the U.S.) and that it includes Uber Eats. 

I estimate that the cost per mile of autonomous ride services will be approximately $1.25 per mile and will get even lower over time. Reference my previous articles for more discussion on the economics of ARS. Fundamentally the cost difference is the elimination of a driver. The cost of ridesharing cannot possibly compete with the eventual cost of ARS. It's the fundamental fact that a capital and technology intensive model will always replace a labor-intensive model.

Uber acknowledges the eventual advantage of autonomous ride services in its S-1. It states the threat of new competitors, including Waymo (GOOGL), Cruise Automation (GM), and Apple (AAPL) in its market. It also states that the use of autonomous vehicles could substantially reduce the cost of providing ridesharing, meal delivery, or logistics services, which could allow competitors to offer such services at a substantially lower price compared to the price available to consumers on its platform. (The emphasis in bold is mine.)

we believe that autonomous vehicle technologies may have the ability to meaningfully impact the industries in which we compete. Several other companies, including Waymo, Cruise Automation, Tesla, Apple, Zoox, Aptiv, May Mobility, Pronto ai, Aurora, and Nuro, are also developing autonomous vehicle technologies, either alone or through collaborations with car manufacturers, and we expect that they will use such technology to further compete with us in the personal mobility, meal delivery, or logistics industries. We expect certain competitors to commercialize autonomous vehicle technologies at scale before we do. Waymo has already introduced a commercialized ridehailing fleet of autonomous vehicles, and it is possible that other of our competitors could introduce autonomous vehicle offerings earlier than we will. In the event that our competitors bring autonomous vehicles to market before we do, or their technology is or is perceived to be superior to ours, they may be able to leverage such technology to compete more effectively with us, which would adversely impact our financial performance and our prospects. For example, use of autonomous vehicles could substantially reduce the cost of providing ridesharing, meal delivery, or logistics services, which could allow competitors to offer such services at a substantially lower price as compared to the price available to consumers on our platform. If a significant number of consumers choose to use our competitors’ offerings over ours, our financial performance and prospects would be adversely impacted.

It's very likely that ARS will have significant competitive advantages over ridesharing. So the questions then are: (1) Will it make enough money before the transition to ARS?, (2) What is Uber's strategy for ARS?, (3) Will it have competitive advantages?, and (4)

Will Ridesharing Ever Be Profitable?

Most likely, ridesharing, as it is today will never be very profitable, no matter how big the revenue opportunity. We just discussed the cost of more than $2 per mile. There is very little leverage to reduce this with increased volume. 

Drivers currently take more than 75% of the booking. It's unlikely they will work for less. In fact, there is some feeling that they are not paid enough. They provide their own cars. Using the AAA and Uber's estimate for cost per mile of driving, it costs the driver $0.75 per mile for the car. There is also mileage incurred in getting the car to the passenger. Let's say that is only a third of the miles billed, so it costs the driver about $1 per mile. At $2, that leaves drivers with $1 per mile for their time, which isn't very much.

Lyft discussed reducing its operating expenses, particularly insurance expense, to reduce its losses. In its S-1, Uber presents an analysis that it could reduce driver incentives by $3 for a $10-trip. This would enable it to earn $1 per $10-trip instead of losing $2. Again, how likely is it that drivers will work for less.

That leaves price increases as the most likely option to reduce losses. The strategy of investing to create a leadership position in a large market and then increasing prices has worked well. Except, in this case, much lower priced autonomous ride services are on the horizon.

What Is Uber's Autonomous Driving Strategy?

Uber's has a three-pronged strategy for autonomous driving. It is investing in developing its own autonomous technology. It plans to integrate this technology into purpose-built Toyota vehicles, and it is working with Volvo to develop a fleet of autonomous cars to be deployed on its network. It is also expecting Daimler to use its own fleet of autonomous vehicles on Uber's network. Here is how it summarizes its strategy in the S-1:

We are investing in technology to power the next generation of transportation. Our Advanced Technologies Group (“ATG”) focuses on developing autonomous vehicle technologies, which we believe have the long-term potential to provide safer and more efficient rides and deliveries to consumers as well as lower prices.

We believe that we have three attractive options with various levels of integration incorporating autonomous vehicle technologies into our network, as demonstrated by our existing partnerships with original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”):

  • Toyota. Announced in August 2018, we expect to integrate our autonomous vehicle technologies into purpose-built Toyota vehicles to be deployed on our network.

  • Volvo. Announced in August 2016, we are working with Volvo to develop and build our own fleet of autonomous cars to be deployed on our network.

  • Daimler. Announced in January 2017, we expect to enable Daimler to introduce a fleet of their owned-and-operated autonomous vehicles onto our network

The first two alternatives rely on its success in developing its own autonomous technology. So far, it is behind competitors and may not be investing as much. Uber also will be challenged to come up with the capital required to finance its own ARS fleet. This investment will require tens of billions of dollars. Expected competitors like Waymo (GOOGL) and Apple (AAPL) have easy access to the necessary cash. Uber will need to sell more stock or incur debt to finance competitive ARS fleets, as will GM and Ford.

The third alternative is similar to Lyft's strategy of using its network to deploy a fleet of autonomous vehicles owned by others. The success of this strategy depends on how ARS revenue is split. Will Uber get a fee of 10%-20% per trip (which is less than it currently gets) or will it give the autonomous vehicle fleet provider something like $0.50 per mile and keep the bulk of the profit? Differences over how to split the ARS revenue is probably why those developing autonomous technology plan to deploy their own ARS instead of partnering.

Will Uber Have A Competitive Advantage During the Period of "Hybrid Autonomy"

Uber believes that it will have a competitive advantage during what it refers to as the period of "hybrid autonomy".

Along the way to a potential future autonomous vehicle world, we believe that there will be a long period of hybrid autonomy, in which autonomous vehicles will be deployed gradually against specific use cases while Drivers continue to serve most consumer demand. As we solve specific autonomous use cases, we will deploy autonomous vehicles against them. Such situations may include trips along a standard, well-mapped route in a predictable environment in good weather. In other situations, such as those that involve substantial traffic, complex routes, or unusual weather conditions, we will continue to rely on Drivers. Deciding which trip receives a vehicle driven by a Driver and which receives an autonomous vehicle, and deploying both in real time while maintaining liquidity in all situations, is a dynamic that we believe is imperative for the success of an autonomous vehicle future. Accordingly, we believe that we will be uniquely suited for this dynamic during the expected long hybrid period of co-existence of Drivers and autonomous vehicles.

The success of this competitive advantage is questionable. First, will users go first to the Uber app to find the appropriate driver-based or AV-based ride? If they do, then Uber could have an advantage. But if they go first to the Waymo One or Cruise Anywhere app or the potential Apple app on their iPhones, then there is no competitive advantage. If they can't get an ARS route on one of these apps then they will go to the Uber app for a driver-based ride.

Second, as Uber describes this hybrid process, the ARS trips will "cherry pick" the best trips. Uber drivers will be left with the trips in "substantial traffic, complex routes and unusual weather conditions. I doubt that Uber drivers will find this attractive enough to continue driving.

How Long Will It Take Until the Next Generation Displaces Ridesharing?

Uber is correct that there will be a gradual transition from ridesharing to ARS. In fact, it could take a decade or maybe more for the transition to be fully completed. Initially, ARS will be offered only in selected metropolitan areas. Most of these will be warm weather climates in the southern or western parts of the country. So, the erosion of market share will happen first in those areas, and the market share for ridesharing will begin to erode there. Ridesharing will continue to be the primary solution in the Northern part of the country for a longer period of time.

ARS will also provide rides for certain routes initially. These routes will be the easier high-volume routes, such as from hotels to airports, from residential to commercial areas, etc. While it's easy to say this will limit the penetration of ARS, the 80/20 rule will apply. It will serve 20% of the routes that provide 80% of the trips.

It took almost a decade for streaming to replace CDs and DVDs, but during that period their sales continually declined. Similarly, it will probably take a decade for ARS to displace ridesharing, but during that decade ridesharing revenue will decline. I expect the ramp-up of ARS will start in 2021 (refer to some of my previous Seeking Alpha articles for a more detailed discussion of this). It will take a while, possibly until the mid-2020s, for the erosion of ridesharing to become significant. But it is coming, so investors need to consider it.

Is Waymo Worth More Than Uber?

Back to the initial questions. Is Uber worth as much as $100 billion? To justify this you either need to see it making enough money in the next 3-5 years before the erosion of the ridesharing market, or believe that it will have sufficient competitive advantages in autonomous ride services (ARS). Alternatively, you can also bet that autonomous driving will never be feasible. This is not a bet I would take based on the progress being made, the vast amount of money being invested in it, and its dramatic benefits. 

Is Waymo (GOOGL) worth more than Uber? For that matter, is GM's (GM) Cruise Automation business, and Apple's (AAPL) potential entry into autonomous ride services worth more too? It is almost inevitable that ARS will replace ridesharing, at least major portions of the ridesharing market. The new competitors in this next generation market inevitably will receive the value and more that is given to ridesharing companies today.

Waymo is the leader in introducing autonomous ride services (ARS) and therefore it may be logical to assume it will be worth much more than Uber at some point in the future. Waymo is part of Alphabet (GOOGL). It doesn't carry its own valuation, so it's impossible to determine the value attributed to it. Alphabet is valued at a little over $350 billion with almost all of its current valuation based on its core business.

Will Alphabet spin-off Waymo? There is a good chance of that. The auto companies, Ford and GM, are positioning themselves to spin-off their ARS businesses. Although it is still too early to be sure, there are several good reasons for this, and it is likely that the others will do this as well.

Conclusion

Ridesharing may never be very profitable. It seems clear, to me at least, that autonomous ride services will eventually displace ridesharing as it is today. Uber's S-1 filing tends to agree with that. Investors in Uber are advised to assess its longer-term strategy for autonomous ride services as much, if not more, than its growth prospects for ridesharing. When they do that, it raises the legitimate question: Is Waymo, and the others investing in ARS, worth more than Uber?